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DI-2: H62/4/947-85

THE SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE

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A BRIEF HISTORY
1947-1985

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THE SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
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1947-1985

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Historical Office
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 1985

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Foreword

The largest U.S. governmental institution, the Department of Defense touches the lives of many Americans. Since its creation in 1947 it has embraced the total military establishment of the United States, including the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a host of auxiliary agencies. At the helm of the department is the secretary of defense, who is answerable to the president for the direction of this huge establishment.

In discharging its responsibility to keep the nation informed about national defense, the Department of Defense publishes documents and histories pertaining to its activities. This publication is intended to meet a long-felt need for a brief history of the office of the secretary of defense. The evolution of the office and its major activities,

policies, and programs are examined through the careers of the 15 men who served as secretary of defense between 1947 and 1985. Their record has been diverse owing to differences of personality, philosophy, and circumstance, but they have in all instances occupied a position of crucial importance to U.S. national security. In their role as "principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense," they have molded events and shaped policies of national and international consequence. This study seeks to convey a sense of the enormous variety of national security problems which confronted them and their efforts to cope with them.

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Introduction: The Cold War and the National Security Act of 1947

The Department of Defense (DoD), initially named the National Military Establishment (NME), was created by the National Security Act of 26 July 1947. This law "to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States" reflected the military experience of the nation during World War II and the new imperatives of the postwar world. In 1947 the international setting differed radically from what it had been when war broke out in 1939, as did the role that the United States was playing in it.

Before World War II the United States usually pursued a policy of political aloofness ("isolationism") outside the western hemisphere—trying to avoid both "entangling alliances" and intervention in political disputes abroad. U.S. participation in World War I in 1917–18 was only a temporary departure from this policy. The United States Senate, in rejecting the Treaty of Versailles in 1919–20, repudiated President Woodrow Wilson's plan for the United States to play a leading role in the League of Nations. In the 1930s the isolationist impulse in the United States was still strong; even as European and Asian nations moved steadily toward another war, many Americans felt that geographical detachment would allow the United States to avoid military involvement.

The nation's approach to foreign policy and the anti-military tradition dating to the colonial period ruled out the maintenance of large military forces except in wartime. The United States mobilized forces when necessary to fight a war, and then quickly demobilized them at war's end. In 1938, one year before World War II, the U.S. armed forces had a personnel strength of only 323,000. The mind-set against a large standing army was as ingrained as that against entangling alliances; the two traditions went hand in hand.

World War II changed everything. Drawn into the conflict in December 1941, the United States mounted a massive military effort. At the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945 the armed forces of the United States totaled more than 12 million. Bowing to irresistible public pressure, President Harry S. Truman followed the usual postwar course of rapid demobilization: military strength declined to about 3 million on 30 June 1946 and a little more than 1.5 million a year later. But prewar traditions had weakened; the Truman administration and much of the American public believed that isolation was no longer possible and

that the United States would have to play a leading role in preserving peace in the postwar era.

The war radically altered the global political balance. Only two dominant nations emerged—the United States and the Soviet Union. As wartime allies, to some extent they sublimated ideological and other disagreements, but these differences resurfaced by 1945 and evolved into a "Cold War." Actually, the origins of the Cold War can be traced back to at least November 1917 when the Bolsheviks took power in Russia. The United States declined on ideological and political grounds to recognize the Soviet government until 1933. Even during World War II, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States had serious differences, including the establishment of the Allied second front in Western Europe, the abrupt cutoff in lend-lease after the German surrender, and U.S. delay in acting on a Soviet request for a substantial reconstruction loan.

At the same time, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt became disturbed about Russian territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe, under Red Army occupation at the end of the war. The Yalta Conference's Declaration on Liberated Europe in February 1945, calling for "democratic" governments in these nations, failed to prevent the Soviets from installing communist regimes after the war in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet zone of Germany. By 1947 what Churchill termed an "iron curtain" had divided Europe into two hostile camps.

Still other controversies between the Soviet Union and the Western allies dramatized the emergence of the Cold War. Policy disputes developed in the bodies set up to administer occupation zones in Germany and Berlin. By 1947 Germany had moved toward permanent division into Western and Soviet-controlled areas. In 1946 in Iran the Soviets, seeking oil concessions, refused to evacuate their occupation forces as promised. Only after intense pressure by the United States and introduction of the issue into the United Nations did the Soviets withdraw.

The new United Nations itself became an early Cold War battleground. Frequent Soviet use of the veto power in the Security Council and failure of the United States and the USSR to agree on a plan for international control of atomic energy raised

serious questions about the UN's ultimate effectiveness. In Asia sources of U.S.-Soviet rivalry included Korea, where U.S. occupation in the south and Soviet occupation in the north led to the creation of separate politico-economic systems impeding the planned unification of the nation; Indochina, where the United States and the Soviet Union supported opposite sides in an internal struggle between French-led forces and a communist army under a provisional government headed by Ho Chi Minh; Japan, where the United States denied the Soviets a meaningful role in the occupation; and China, where a civil war raged between the Communists under Mao Tse-tung and the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek.

In Greece, a civil war between an anticommunist coalition and a communist-led National Liberation Front broke out as World War II ended. Turkey felt endangered by historic Soviet demands, which intensified in 1945 and 1946, to share control of the strategic Straits area. Concern about the fate of Greece and Turkey heightened in February 1947 when Great Britain informed the United States that it could no longer continue to provide military and economic support to the two nations. The Truman administration responded with the "Truman Doctrine," which by implication extended well beyond Greece and Turkey and signaled the adoption of a central Cold War policy. In his speech to Congress requesting \$400 million in economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey, Truman said: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way." In uttering these words, Truman formally inaugurated what later was called the "containment" policy, a term derived from an influential article published in July 1947 by Soviet expert George F. Kennan, a career foreign service officer then serving as head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.

A second example of the containment approach followed closely on the heels of the Truman Doctrine—the Marshall Plan, a program of economic aid for Europe proposed in June 1947 by Secretary of State George C. Marshall. Characterized by President Truman as "two halves of the same walnut," the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan shared the same objective—to thwart Soviet expansion.

In 1947, just as the United States responded to the Soviet challenge with these foreign policy initiatives, a new security system, long debated, and

now acquiring added urgency, emerged in the National Security Act of 1947. Before World War II, the War Department, established in 1789, and the Navy Department, organized in 1798, operated as separate entities. The Department of State managed foreign relations, with little direct coordination with the military services. World War II and its aftermath demonstrated that the separation of political and military affairs was obsolete. This changed relationship was a major consideration in the passage of the National Security Act and its amendments, which created a comprehensive national security structure, including a "unified" military establishment.

The push toward unification, though dating more immediately from World War II, was foreshadowed as early as the turn of the century. Military experience in the war with Spain in 1898 and the concurrent emergence of the United States onto the world stage, in spite of the persistence of a policy of political aloofness, lent impetus to early efforts toward coordination by the military services, beginning with the establishment in 1903 of the Joint Army and Navy Board. The historical significance of this advisory group of high-ranking officers, officially existing until 1947, was chiefly as an early symbol of the unification movement.

Between 1921 and 1945, Congress entertained more than 50 proposals on armed forces unification. Many of them, stressing efficiency and economy, proposed consolidation of the War and Navy departments into a "Department of National Defense." Throughout this period the Army and Navy consistently opposed unification. Both services feared loss of autonomy and questioned whether unification would result in significant lowering of defense costs. The Air Corps, an integral part of the U.S. Army since creation of the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps in 1907, supported the proposals, most of which provided for a separate air arm.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the subsequent U.S. war experience stirred anew consideration of unification proposals. The war proved the need for teamwork among U.S. forces as well as between the United States and its allies. In war theaters this usually meant combined commands, involving U.S. and Allied forces, exercising direction of land, sea, and air units. This approach worked particularly well in Europe where General Dwight D. Eisenhower served as supreme commander of Allied forces in 1944-45. In the Pacific area, where General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz headed separate theaters of operation, uni-

ty of command did not go as far. In Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), first organized in 1942, oversaw general strategic direction of the war, with considerable personal involvement of the president as constitutional commander in chief. The services learned during the war the importance of close cooperation in strategic planning, military operations, and logistical support. While a large measure of interservice coordination and cooperation necessarily existed on the home front, much duplication, competition, and conflict occurred as well, especially in such areas as manpower, procurement, and logistics.

Thus before the war ended serious interservice problems spurred new unification proposals. By this time the Army favored such plans because it recognized the inevitability of a separate air service and saw the virtue of more centralized direction of the military. The Army Air Forces wanted independence, while the Navy, worried about possible loss of its air arm and survival of the Marine Corps, continued to oppose unification.

The first public airing of the unification issue during World War II occurred in the spring of 1944 before the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, chaired by Rep. Clifton A. Woodrum. Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney on behalf of the Army proposed establishment of a Department of the Armed Forces, headed by a single secretary, who would be the president's principal adviser on political, economic, and administrative aspects of defense organization. There would also be service under secretaries as well as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of a central chief of staff and the chiefs of staff of the services. The heart of this proposal, from the Army's point of view, was the creation of an integrated command system. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal and other Navy representatives did not support the Army's command integration proposals, stressing the need for further study, a recommendation the Woodrum committee adopted in its June 1944 report.

In the meantime the JCS created a Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense under Admiral James O. Richardson. In its final report, with Admiral Richardson dissenting, the committee recommended establishment of a Department of the Armed Forces headed by a civilian secretary (but with no other civilian officials representing the three services), a single commander of the armed forces supported by a general staff, and individual commanders for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The secretary of the armed forces, the commander of the armed forces—

serving also as the president's chief of staff—and the service commanders would constitute the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, responsible for advising the president on military strategy and the defense budget. In sum, the Richardson committee proposed a powerful military commander/chief of staff, subject to the civilian control of the secretary and the president.

In hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in late 1945, Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins presented a composite Army plan drawn from both the McNarney and JCS reports. The Collins plan envisioned a Department of the Armed Forces with a secretary, under secretary, and three assistant secretaries (for scientific research, procurement and industrial mobilization, and legislative affairs and public information). The military side of the proposed department would include a chief of staff of the Armed Forces presiding over Army, Navy, and Air components, each with its own chief of staff. The chief of staff of the Armed Forces, the component chiefs of staff, and the president's chief of staff would make up the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, responsible for recommendations to the president, through the civilian secretary, on military strategy and the budget.

Army and Army Air Forces witnesses generally favored the Collins plan. The Navy objected strongly to its single integrated command structure, arguing that it subverted the necessary balancing of the separate military elements and the principle of civilian control. The Navy also feared it would lose its autonomy and that naval aviation would go to the proposed air component and the Marine Corps to the Army.

In a more positive vein, the Navy put forward its own suggestions in the Eberstadt report, named after Ferdinand Eberstadt, former chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board and vice chairman of the War Production Board, commissioned by Forrestal to present recommendations on postwar service unification and national security. Eberstadt's report in September 1945 rejected service unification, proposing instead three "coordinate departments" for War, Navy, and Air. Reflecting Navy concern about its air component, Eberstadt recommended retention of the Navy's existing air arm as well as Army retention of some special purpose air components. The "keystone" of the national security structure was to be a new National Security Council, a policy-forming and advisory rather than executive agency, to include the president (as chairman), the secretaries of state, war, navy, and air, and the chairman of a new National Security Resources Board. Eberstadt also proposed con-

tinuation of the JCS on a statutory basis and establishment of several joint boards and agencies..

Eberstadt's plan put forward the Navy point of view but nevertheless sought to respond to the World War II experience, reflected in the proposed structure of boards and committees to handle specific missions. The introduction of a National Security Council indicated recognition of the new international situation prevailing at the end of the war, the active world role that the United States would play, and the need to integrate military and foreign policies into a broader national security policy. In recommending a commission to make an "over-all study of the problems of national security," Eberstadt perhaps hoped to delay, if not prevent, more radical alterations of the existing military system.

On 19 December 1945 President Truman proposed to Congress the establishment of a unified military department, stating that "one of the lessons which have most clearly come from the costly and dangerous experience of this war is that there must be unified direction of land, sea and air forces at home as well as in all other parts of the world where our Armed Forces are serving." Truman listed several objectives: integrated strategic plans; a unified military program and budget; cost savings; coordination between the military and the rest of the government; strong civilian control of the military; parity for air power; systematic allocation of scientific research resources; unity of command in outlying bases; and equitable personnel policies. Specifically, Truman proposed a Department of National Defense headed by a secretary of national defense, with "coordinated branches" for land, naval, and air forces under assistant secretaries. The Navy would retain both its aviation service and the Marine Corps. A chief of staff and commanders of the three coordinate services were to be "an advisory body to the Secretary of National Defense and to the President."

While the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs held hearings during the spring and summer of 1946 on a unification bill embodying many of the president's ideas, Truman requested Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to settle on a unification plan. They soon reported some agreement but failed to resolve differences on four key issues: a single military department (Army yes, Navy no); three coordinate branches (Army yes, Navy no); military aviation (Army favored consolidation, with certain excepted responsibilities vested in the Navy; the Navy wanted its own air component); and functions of

the Marine Corps. In June 1946 the president indicated his preferences: a Department of National Defense headed by a cabinet-rank civilian, with three subordinate service secretaries without cabinet rank; three coordinate services; an Air Force with basic responsibility for aviation and the Navy's retention of its own air arm; and the Marines remaining under the Navy Department with their functions intact. Truman stated when communicating these positions that he had "no desire or intention to affect adversely the integrity of any of the services."

On 26 February 1947, after Patterson and Forrestal finally agreed on a unification plan, the president sent a draft unification bill to Congress. Following extensive hearings, Congress approved and President Truman signed the National Security Act (Public Law 253, 80th Congress) on 26 July 1947. The law's "declaration of policy" outlined its essential purposes:

to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy . . . and the Air Force . . . ; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

Title I of the National Security Act established three agencies—the National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). The National Security Council's main function was to advise the president "with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." The council's membership included the president as presiding officer; the secretaries of state, defense, army, navy, and air force; the chairman of the NSRB; and other specified officials when

designated by the president and approved by the Senate. The NSC was to have a staff headed by a civilian executive secretary. The law left the details of NSC organization and duties to presidential discretion.

The Central Intelligence Agency succeeded the existing Central Intelligence Group. Headed by a director of central intelligence (DCI), the agency's basic functions were to coordinate intelligence activities of all government departments and agencies relating to national security, make recommendations to the NSC on these activities, and correlate, evaluate, and disseminate national security intelligence. The National Security Resources Board, headed by a civilian chairman and including heads or representatives of executive agencies as designated by the president, had as its basic function advising the president on "the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization."

Title II of the National Security Act created the National Military Establishment (NME), consisting of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and several other agencies. Unlike other cabinet-level departments, the NME was a confederation of three coordinate departments plus other offices, boards, and agencies. This organizational scheme represented the middle ground emerging from the unification debate of 1944-47; it retained the Navy Department, redesignated the War Department as the Department of the Army, and established the Department of the Air Force. The new structure avoided a true merger—one service under all-powerful civilian and military leaders. The law gave to the new civilian position of secretary of defense the power to "establish general direction, authority, and control" over the NME, "take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research," and "supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates." The secretary of defense was authorized three special assistants and other civilian and military personnel as necessary to run the NME—providing the basis for what evolved into the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

According the secretaries of the army, navy, and air force substantial independent authority, the National Security Act stated that their departments "shall be administered as individual executive departments by their respective Secretaries and all powers and duties relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense by this Act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries." Congress defined in

general terms the composition, roles, and missions of the military services.

Title II also established the War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board (MB), and the Research and Development Board (RDB). The War Council, composed of the secretaries of defense, army, navy, and air force, and the three military service chiefs, was to advise the secretary of defense, its chairman, "on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces." The JCS, consisting of the military heads of the services and the chief of staff to the commander in chief "if there be one," had specified duties, subject to the authority of the president and secretary of defense, including preparation of strategic plans and strategic direction of the armed forces; preparation of joint logistic plans and the assignment of logistic responsibilities; the establishment of unified commands; formulation of policies for joint training and coordination of military education; and review of major personnel and material requirements of the services. The law specified that the JCS, assisted by a Joint Staff not to exceed 100 officers chosen from the several services, "shall act as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense."

The Munitions Board, successor to the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board established in 1922, included a chairman appointed by the president and an under or assistant secretary from each military department. Its long list of duties included coordinating activities on industrial matters; planning military aspects of industrial mobilization; recommending service assignment of procurement responsibilities and planning standardization of specifications and single procurement procedures; determining relative priorities for the military procurement programs; and working with other departments and agencies to correlate military requirements with the civilian economy.

The Research and Development Board, replacing the Joint Research and Development Board set up in 1946, included a chairman appointed by the president and two representatives from each of the military departments. The RDB's primary task was "to prepare a complete and integrated program of research and development for military purposes." It was also to advise on trends in scientific research relating to national security, recommend measures to coordinate research and development among the military departments, and advise the JCS on the interaction of research and development and strategy.

The National Security Act was not really a "unification" law. Indeed, it replaced two existing

military departments with three and stressed "coordination" rather than unification. The statutory establishment of the JCS along with the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board derived from World War II experience. The creation of other agencies, such as the CIA, the NSRB, and the NSC, acknowledged that both military and foreign policy were components of broad national security policy. The NME system was a compromise between full integration of military functions and maintenance of the status

quo, incorporating ideas put forward by both proponents and opponents of unification. One of the most important laws passed by Congress in the post-World War II period, the National Security Act built the framework for a modern national security structure that could be revised and extended as circumstances warranted. Its passage in 1947 coincided with the emergence of the Cold War and the development by the United States of the containment policy to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union and "international communism."

James V. Forrestal (1947-1949)

Confronted immediately at its creation with complex global problems made more urgent by the Cold War, the new national security system had to begin functioning without delay. Indeed, when James Forrestal became the first secretary of defense on 17 September 1947 his swearing-in took place, at President Truman's order, several days earlier than originally scheduled. Concerned that the communist government of Yugoslavia might attempt to seize the Adriatic city of Trieste, still occupied by U.S. and British troops, Truman decided to have Forrestal assume office immediately.

Fortunately, the first secretary of defense was well-qualified to guide the NME's participation in the national security program inherent in the containment policy. Forrestal was born on 15 February 1892 in Matteawan (now Beacon), New York. His father, who emigrated from Ireland to the United States in 1857, headed a construction company. After graduation from high school in 1908, Forrestal worked for three years on local newspapers in New York State and then entered Dartmouth College as a freshman in 1911. The following year he transferred to Princeton University, which he left in 1915 a few credits short of his degree, apparently because of academic and financial difficulties.

In 1916 Forrestal joined an investment banking house, William A. Read and Company of New York (later Dillon, Read and Company), as a bond salesman. Except for a period of naval duty during World War I, during which he took flight training, Forrestal remained with Dillon, Read until 1940. He rose rapidly in the company, becoming a partner in 1923, vice president in 1926, and president in 1938. His government service began in June



1940 as a special assistant to President Roosevelt. In August 1940 the president nominated Forrestal to fill the new position of under secretary of the navy. Assigned by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to handle contracts, tax and legal affairs, and liaison with several other government agencies, Forrestal built his office into an efficient organization. Most importantly, he ran very effectively the Navy's machinery for industrial mobilization and

procurement. By 19 May 1944, when he became secretary of the navy, succeeding Knox who had died of a heart attack, he had become well-known in Washington as a highly capable administrator and manager. He guided the Navy through the last year of the war and the two difficult years of demobilization after the Japanese surrender.

Forrestal participated prominently in development of the National Security Act of 1947, even though he had opposed unification. Under pressure from President Truman and others, Forrestal, through the 1945 Eberstadt report and negotiations with Secretary of War Patterson, played a major role in devising the initial form of the NME. Although Patterson was President Truman's first choice as secretary of defense, he preferred to return to private life. The president's subsequent selection of Forrestal, however ironic it might have appeared given the secretary of the navy's resistance to unification, was deserved and logical considering his long experience in the defense establishment and dedication to effective government administration.

Forrestal brought to his new office a deep distrust of the Soviet Union and a determination to make the new national security structure workable. He recognized the magnitude of the job; he wrote to a friend shortly after announcement of his appointment, "This office will probably be the greatest cemetery for dead cats in history." He soon discovered that perhaps the chief obstacle to accomplishing his objectives for the NME was the inherent weakness in the secretary of defense's powers as defined in the National Security Act. Another problem was the existence of a virtually autonomous head for each military department. These organizational difficulties, combined with a steady escalation of Cold War tensions, ensured 18 months of frustration for Forrestal.

In February 1948 the Soviet Union completed its network of satellite nations in Eastern Europe, as communists supported by Moscow seized control in Czechoslovakia. In June 1948 the Soviets blockaded land routes from the western zones of Germany to Berlin, forcing the United States and its allies to initiate an airlift which supplied Berlin until Moscow relaxed the blockade 10 months later. In the meantime, war broke out in Palestine between Arab and Israeli armies immediately after the Jewish proclamation of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948. As these events occurred, Congress approved the Marshall Plan, providing economic aid for 16 European nations, and in June 1948 the Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution, encouraging the administration to enter into collective

defense arrangements. The United States and the United Kingdom led in developing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formally established when 12 nations signed the constituting treaty in April 1949. On the other side of the world in China, the Communists made significant headway against the Nationalists, leading in 1949 to final victory and the establishment of the People's Republic of China.

The NME played an important role in the development of U.S. policies and programs to meet these Cold War challenges. Forrestal believed strongly in the need for close coordination of defense and foreign policy and saw the National Security Council as a major instrument for accomplishing this coordination. Although President Truman deemed the NSC a subordinate advisory body—he met infrequently with it before the Korean conflict began in June 1950—Forrestal thought it should originate policy proposals and provide firm guidance for strategic planning. He labored hard, if for the most part unsuccessfully, to increase its influence.

A major source of tension between Forrestal and Truman was the defense budget. Because of public pressures to limit defense expenditures and his predilection for a balanced budget, Truman would not agree to budget levels proposed by Forrestal or the even larger amounts desired by the military services. Disagreements among the services over roles and missions complicated the matter. Because the budget limits Truman imposed exacerbated the competition for scarce funds, the services developed elaborate rationales justifying their views of roles and missions and the funds to support them. The Air Force argued that strategic air power—the long-range bomber carrying nuclear weapons—would be the key factor in any future major conflict. It wanted funds to support 70 groups as well as exclusive use of atomic weapons. On the other hand, the Navy wanted to build large flush-deck carriers from which it could launch naval aircraft carrying atomic weapons. These and other differences among the services surfaced especially during annual NME consideration of the budget.

By the time Forrestal became secretary of defense, most of the advance work on the FY 1949 budget had been completed. Truman submitted it to Congress in January 1948, requesting about \$10 billion plus additional funds for universal military training and equipment stockpiling. The events in Czechoslovakia, Germany, and elsewhere in the early months of 1948 influenced Truman to consider a supplemental appropriation for FY

1949—actually an increase in the recommended budget. While Truman had in mind an additional \$3 billion, the services wanted \$9 billion. The bulk of the supplemental would go to the Air Force if the recommendation of an Air Policy Commission that it needed 70 groups to do its job prevailed.

Hoping to facilitate agreement among the services over the budget and other matters, Forrestal met with the JCS at Key West, Florida, 11–14 March 1948. Out of this meeting and subsequent discussions came a paper entitled "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff" that Forrestal issued on 21 April 1948. Among JCS duties the paper delineated were preparation of strategic plans and provision for strategic direction of the armed forces, establishment of unified commands, and designation of executive agents for certain activities. The Navy received authorization "to conduct air operations as necessary for the accomplishment of objectives in a naval campaign," and the Air Force retained responsibility for strategic air warfare. The Key West document remained in force until the Eisenhower administration issued a revised version in 1954.

Although the Key West agreement smoothed over some service differences, it had limited long-range effect. As for the FY 1949 budget, the JCS agreed on a \$3.5 billion supplemental, enough when added to the original budget to fund 66 Air Force groups; the president reduced it to \$3.1 billion. Congress eventually approved total obligational authority for FY 1949 of \$13.2 billion—\$4.2 billion for the Air Force (including more than \$820 million above what the administration recommended, to fund a 70-group program), \$4.7 billion for the Navy, \$4.03 billion for the Army, and \$270 million for other defense purposes. Truman refused to allow the Air Force to spend the extra funds, limiting it to 59 groups. In terms of 1985 constant dollars, FY 1949 TOA amounted to \$86.7 billion.*

Persistent differences among the services over roles and missions and Truman's determination to keep defense costs down made Forrestal's task in developing the FY 1950 budget extremely difficult.

For example, the Navy and the Air Force continued to disagree over the issue of delivery of atomic weapons. Forrestal discussed this and other matters with the service secretaries and the JCS at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, on 20–22 August 1948. The conferees decided that the Air Force would have interim operational control of atomic weapons, but that "each service, in the fields of its primary missions, must have exclusive responsibility for planning and programming and the necessary authority." In terms of the Air Force–Navy dispute over atomic weapons, the Newport agreement meant that the Air Force should utilize any strategic bombing ability developed by the Navy. This and other decisions reached at Newport calmed interservice dissension somewhat, making it easier to achieve agreement within the NME on the FY 1950 budget.

Although President Truman set a ceiling of \$14.4 billion for FY 1950, the services initially proposed a figure of \$29 billion, later reduced to \$23.6 billion. Forrestal asked the JCS to prepare both a \$14.4 billion plan and an alternate budget of \$17.5 to \$18 billion, hoping that the president might accept the latter. Eventually Forrestal presented two budgets: one for \$14.2 billion (a new ceiling set by the Bureau of the Budget) and the other for \$16.9 billion. Truman summarily rejected the higher version and sent the \$14.2 billion proposal to Congress in January 1949. Congress eventually agreed to about \$14.3 billion, including an extra \$737 million to support 58 Air Force groups rather than the 48 prescribed in Truman's budget proposal. Again Truman made clear that the Air Force would not spend the unsought funds. In developing the 1949 and 1950 budgets Forrestal faced the reality that they did not depend on the military's expressed requirements alone but also on competing domestic needs, political considerations, and the president's own views, and also that the National Security Act had done little to lessen interservice rivalry.

For all the problems, Forrestal could list 15 "solid accomplishments in the process of unification" in his first report as secretary of defense in December 1948. These included the formulation of long-range and short-range strategic plans, the development of an integrated NME budget for FY 1950, the definition of service roles and missions, the coordination of service procurement efforts, and the establishment of additional overseas unified commands. Forrestal observed in this report that "the mere passage of the National Security Act did not mean the accomplishment of its objectives overnight. The most difficult part of

*Total Obligational Authority (TOA) represents the value of the direct defense program for each year, regardless of the method of financing, which could include balances available from prior years or resources available from sale of items from inventory. Throughout this study, TOA figures and FY 1985 constant dollar amounts come from a table prepared in March 1984 by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). The constant dollar figure translates each fiscal year's budget into projected FY 1985 values; they are useful for comparison purposes. See TOA-constant dollar table in Appendix D.

the task of unification is to bring conflicting ideas into harmony How fast we complete the process of resolution will depend on the speed with which we achieve the harmony of thought which is inherent in true unification. I am confident that we shall reach that accord."

Although he still felt the National Security Act provided "a sound basis for substantial progress in the unification of the armed forces," Forrestal recommended several amendments reflecting his personal experience after 15 months as secretary of defense: establishment of the position of under secretary of defense; major strengthening of the secretary of defense's authority by giving him specific rather than "general" responsibility for exercising "direction, authority, and control" over the NME; removal of the chief of staff to the commander in chief as a member of the JCS; designation of a JCS chairman; increasing the size of the JCS Joint Staff; clarification of the secretary's role in personnel matters; and dropping the service secretaries from NSC membership, leaving the secretary of defense as the only NME member.

Much of what Forrestal suggested had already been recommended in a November 1948 report of the Committee on National Security Organization (headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt), established by the Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. President Truman followed up the Eberstadt and Forrestal proposals with a message to Congress on 5 March 1949 recommending specific changes in the National Security Act, most importantly converting the NME into an executive department—the Department of Defense—and providing the secretary of defense "with appropriate responsibility and authority, and with civilian and military assistance adequate to fulfill his enlarged responsibility."

These proposals reflected Forrestal's experiences as secretary of defense. He had left the ranks of those favoring merely coordination and had joined the advocates of a more genuine and thoroughgoing unification. His commitment to making effective the national security structure outlined in the 1947 law increased in urgency as he became more and more concerned about the Soviet

military threat. The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act stand as testimony to Forrestal's determination to improve the defense structure.

The amendments, in Public Law 216, 10 August 1949, included these major provisions: The service secretaries were no longer NSC members; an executive department, the Department of Defense, replaced the NME, and the departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force became *military* departments; the secretary of defense received "direction, authority, and control" (eliminating the modifying word "general") over the Department of Defense, and the military departments were to be "separately administered by their respective Secretaries under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense"; the offices of deputy secretary and three assistant secretaries of defense were created (the deputy secretary replaced the under secretary, a position established in April 1949, and the assistant secretaries replaced the three "special assistants" authorized in the 1947 legislation); the JCS acquired a non-voting chairman; the JCS Joint Staff increased to 210 officers; and the office of comptroller of the Department of Defense, to be filled by one of the assistant secretaries, became statutory.

The 1949 amendments began the legislative process of clarifying and expanding the powers of the secretary of defense. In fact, centralization of authority in the Office of the Secretary of Defense became a rather constant objective under Forrestal and many of his successors. Unfortunately, Forrestal was no longer in the Pentagon when Congress approved these amendments. He left office on 28 March 1949 and died tragically less than two months later. Not only the first but one of the most notable secretaries of defense, his contributions have been commemorated by a bronze bust at the Pentagon's Mall Entrance and by the designation of a major federal office building in downtown Washington as the Forrestal Building. Some months after he left office, the House Armed Services Committee, with which he had worked closely over the years, described his administration as secretary of defense as "able, sensitive, restrained, and far-sighted."

Louis A. Johnson (1949-1950)

Forrestal's successor, Louis A. Johnson, born in Roanoke, Virginia, on 10 January 1891, earned a law degree from the University of Virginia. Upon graduation he practiced law in Clarksburg, West Virginia; his firm, Steptoe and Johnson, eventually opened offices in Charleston, West Virginia, and Washington, D.C. Elected to the West Virginia House of Delegates in 1916, he served as majority floor leader and chairman of the Judiciary Committee. During World War I, Johnson saw action as an Army officer in France. After the war he resumed his law practice and was active in veterans' affairs, helping to found the American Legion and serving as its national commander in 1932-33. As assistant secretary of war between 1937 and 1940, Johnson advocated universal military training, rearmament, and expansion of military aviation. He practiced law from 1940 to 1949, except for several months in 1942 when he served as the president's personal representative in India.

During 1948 Johnson acted as chief fundraiser for President Truman's campaign. After Truman chose him to succeed Forrestal early in 1949, there were allegations that his appointment was a political payoff, but his experience in veterans' affairs and as assistant secretary of war strengthened his credentials. Johnson entered office sharing the president's commitment to achieve further military unification and control costs while maintaining adequate defense forces. These commitments inspired Johnson, an outspoken and forceful leader, a stormy term in the Pentagon. At a press conference the day after he took office, Johnson promised a drastic cut in the number of NME boards, committees, and commissions, and added, "To the limit the present law allows, I promise you there will be unification as rapidly as the efficiency of the service permits it." Later, in one of his frequent speeches on unification, Johnson stated that "this nation can no longer tolerate the autonomous conduct of any single service. . . . A waste of the resources of America in spendthrift defense is an invitation to disaster for America."

Johnson welcomed the passage of the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, telling an American Legion convention that he was "happy to report . . . that 80 percent of the problems that beset unification immediately disappeared when the President signed the bill increasing the authority and the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense." Believing that the amendments would help him promote economy, he estimated that one year after their passage the Defense Department



would be achieving savings at the rate of \$1 billion per year, and he later claimed that he had attained this goal. One of his slogans was that the taxpayer was going to get "a dollar's worth of defense for every dollar spent" by the Pentagon, an approach that Truman approved. For FY 1951, Johnson supported Truman's recommendation of \$13.3 billion, but a month after the fighting in Korea started, the secretary proposed a supplemental appropriation of \$10.5 billion, bringing the total requested to \$23.8 billion. Johnson told a House subcommittee when recommending the supplemental that "in the light of the actual fighting that is now in progress, we have reached the point where the military considerations clearly outweigh the fiscal considerations."

It took a war to divert Johnson from his economy drive, which began on 23 April 1949, when he announced cancellation of the 65,000-ton flush-deck aircraft carrier U.S.S. *United States*. The Navy had been planning this ship for several years and construction had already begun. Johnson, supported by a majority of the JCS and by President Truman, stressed the need to cut costs. At least by implication, Johnson had scuttled the Navy's hope to participate in strategic air operations through

use of the carrier. Abruptly resigning, Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan expressed concern about the future of the Marine Corps and naval aviation and about "the unprecedented action on the part of a Secretary of Defense in so drastically and arbitrarily changing and restricting the operational plans of an armed service without consultation with that service."

The cancellation of the supercarrier precipitated a bitter controversy between the Navy and the Air Force, usually labeled the "revolt of the admirals." The Navy reacted to Johnson's action by questioning, in congressional hearings and other public arenas, the effectiveness of the Air Force's latest strategic bomber, the B-36. The Air Force countered with data supporting the B-36 and minimized the importance of a naval role in future major wars.

In June 1949 the House Committee on Armed Services launched an investigation into charges, emanating unofficially from Navy sources, of malfeasance in office against Secretary Johnson and Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington. The hearings also looked into the capability of the B-36, the cancellation of the supercarrier, and JCS procedures on weapon development, and ultimately examined the whole course of unification. Besides disparaging the B-36, Navy representatives questioned the current U.S. military plan for immediate use of atomic weapons against large urban areas when a war started. The Navy argued that such an approach would not harm military targets, and that tactical air power, ground troops, and sea power were the elements necessary to defend the United States and Europe against attack. The Air Force countered that atomic weapons and long-range strategic bombers would deter war, but that if war nevertheless broke out an immediate atomic offensive against the enemy would contribute to the success of surface actions and reduce U.S. casualties. Strategic bombing, the Air Force contended, was the major counterbalance to the Soviet Union's vastly superior ground forces.

In its final report, the House Armed Services Committee found no substance to the charges relating to Johnson's and Symington's roles in aircraft procurement. It held that evaluation of the B-36's worth was the responsibility of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, and that the services should not pass judgment jointly on weapons proposed by one service. On cancellation of the supercarrier, the committee questioned the qualifications of the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff, who had testified in support of Johnson's decision, to determine vessels appropriate for the

Navy. The committee, disapproving of Johnson's "summary manner" of canceling the carrier and failure to consult congressional committees before acting, stated that "national defense is not strictly an executive department undertaking; it involves not only the Congress but the American people as a whole speaking through their Congress. The committee can in no way condone this manner of deciding public questions."

The committee expressed solid support for effective unification, but stated that "there is such a thing as seeking too much unification too fast" and observed that "there has been a Navy reluctance in the interservice marriage, an overardent Army, a somewhat exuberant Air Force It may well be stated that the committee finds no unification Puritans in the Pentagon."

Finally, the committee condemned the dismissal of Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, the chief of naval operations, who accepted cancellation of the supercarrier but testified critically on defense planning and administration of unification. Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews fired Denfeld on 27 October 1949, explaining that they disagreed widely on strategic policy and unification. The House Armed Services Committee concluded that Denfeld's removal was a reprisal because of his testimony and "a blow against effective representative government."

Although Johnson emerged from the "revolt of the admirals" with his reputation intact, the controversy weakened his position with the services and probably with the president. Notwithstanding Johnson's emphasis on unification, it was debatable how far it had really progressed, given the bitter recriminations exchanged by the Air Force and the Navy during the controversy, which went far beyond the initial question of the supercarrier to more fundamental issues—strategic doctrine, service roles and missions, and the authority of the secretary of defense.

Johnson's term also was marked by momentous international events that required difficult national security decisions. The Berlin crisis ended in May 1949, when the Russians lifted the blockade. Johnson pointed to the airlift as a "technological triumph that advanced the science of air cargo transportation many years" and as an example of the fruits of unification. A week after Johnson took office, the United States and 11 other nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty, creating a regional organization that became the heart of a comprehensive collective security system. After initial reservations, Johnson supported NATO and the program of military assistance for NATO and other

U.S. allies instituted by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 6 October 1949.

In August 1949, earlier than U.S. intelligence analysts had anticipated, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic device. This event and the almost concurrent collapse of the Chinese Nationalists hastened debate within the administration as to whether the United States should develop a fusion, or hydrogen, bomb. Conceiving the bomb as a deterrent rather than offensive weapon, Truman decided on 31 January 1950 to proceed; Johnson supported the president's decision. Truman at the same time directed the secretaries of state and defense to review and reassess U.S. national security policy in the light of the Soviet atomic explosion, the Communist victory in China, and the hydrogen bomb decision. Johnson went about this task reluctantly, presumably because the State Department took the lead and heavily influenced the contents of the resultant report—NSC 68. Although Truman took no immediate formal action on the large rearmament effort proposed in NSC 68, the report became more pertinent when the North Koreans attacked across the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950. Johnson's obstinate attitude toward the State Department role in the preparation of this paper adversely affected his relations with both Acheson and Truman. Although he publicly professed belief that "the advance guard in the campaign for peace that America wages today must be the State Department," his disagreements with Acheson and his restrictions on DoD contacts with the State Department persisted until the exigencies of the Korean War moderated them somewhat.

Although he had followed faithfully President Truman's lead in imposing economy measures on the armed forces, Johnson received much of the blame for the initial setbacks in Korea. U.S. involvement in the war and the continued priority accorded to European security necessitated rapid, substantive changes in defense policy—including a long-term expansion of the armed forces and more emphasis on the military buildup of U.S. allies. Truman decided these tasks required new leadership in the Department of Defense. When Johnson resigned at Truman's request on 19 September 1950, the president replaced him with General George C. Marshall.

Johnson was a controversial secretary of defense. Considered a purely political appointee by some, and trying to follow in the footsteps of a highly respected predecessor, Johnson became embroiled in controversy almost immediately. Once he had weathered the supercarrier storm, other problems bore down on him—continued service quarreling, differences with Acheson, and above all the Korean War. At the time of his appointment Johnson met the president's needs; by September 1950, with the Korean conflict in full swing, he had become a liability. He returned to his law practice, which he pursued until his death in Washington at the age of 75 on 24 April 1966. In his last speech as secretary of defense the day before he left office, Johnson observed: "When the hurly burly's done and the battle is won I trust the historian will find my record of performance creditable, my services honest and faithful commensurate with the trust that was placed in me and in the best interests of peace and our national defense."

George C. Marshall (1950–1951)

Given the controversy surrounding Johnson's performance, and especially the military situation in Korea, President Truman recognized the need to choose a person of great national prestige to head the Department of Defense. His selection of General Marshall eminently met this requirement. The son of a coal merchant, Marshall was born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, on 31 December 1880. He entered the Virginia Military Institute in 1897, graduated in 1901, and took a commission as second lieutenant in the United States Army in 1902.

By 1917 he had served in the Philippines and at several stations in the United States, including two service schools. Marshall had extensive combat experience in Europe during World War I, and between 1919 and 1924 he was aide-de-camp to General John J. Pershing. After three years in China (1924–27), he served for the next dozen years at several posts in the United States, beginning with more than four years as assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, where many of the future Army leaders



of World War II were on his faculty and staff. He became a brigadier general in 1936.

In 1939, just as World War II began in Europe, President Roosevelt appointed Marshall Army chief of staff. In that position and as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff beginning in 1942, Marshall labored unceasingly to build up U.S. defenses and to prepare the Army for action. President Truman later described him as the "architect of victory" in World War II.

Within weeks after Marshall retired from the Army in November 1945 the president sent him to China in an unsuccessful attempt to mediate the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists and to establish a coalition government. He returned to the United States in January 1947 to become secretary of state for a momentous two years, marked by the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and negotiation of the NATO pact. After he left the State Department he achieved further distinction as president of the American Red Cross.

Marshall's appointment as secretary of defense required a special congressional waiver because the National Security Act prohibited a commissioned military officer on active duty within the previous 10 years from holding the post. Although the Senate approved quickly, questions did surface

about a military leader holding a position clearly intended for a civilian. With the Johnson-Acheson competition in mind, some senators queried Marshall about his views on State-Defense relationships and service unification. Marshall noted that he had "suffered from the lack of unification throughout the war" and also that he had initiated several Army unification studies during the war period.

Marshall's central concern as secretary of defense was the Korean War. Believing that the communist attack "left no doubt that the Soviet Government and its satellites were willing to risk a general war by multiple aggression all over the world" and that "our well-known military weakness encouraged Communist aggression in Korea," Marshall promoted a rapid expansion of the armed forces. Between July 1950 and June 1951, U.S. military strength increased from 1,460,000 to 3,250,000, with the final goal for July 1952 set at 3,600,000. Although Korea was an immediate concern, Marshall wanted "an enduring system of national defense." During the "great debate" over U.S. national security policy in the spring of 1951, Marshall vigorously backed the administration's controversial proposal, which Congress finally approved, to increase U.S. ground forces supporting NATO in Europe from two to six divisions.

Because he saw the necessity for long-term preparedness, Marshall argued strenuously for universal military training (UMT), formally proposed by President Truman in March 1948. He described the Military Training and Service Act of 1951, although less than he wanted, as a "step of historic significance." This legislation revised the Selective Service Act of 1948 by lowering the draft age from 19 to 18 1/2, increasing the period of service from 21 to 24 months, and setting the total service obligation (active and reserve) at 8 years. It also approved UMT in principle, based on induction of youths for 6 months' service in a "National Security Training Corps." Although Marshall expressed confidence that Congress would pass legislation implementing UMT, it never did, thus eliminating what he considered the act's most important feature.

Confirming the crucial importance of manpower matters, Marshall established the new position of assistant secretary of defense for manpower and personnel and recruited for the post Anna M. Rosenberg, a dynamic labor and public relations specialist with previous service in the federal government. Responsible for industrial and service manpower, universal military training, and selec-

tive service, Rosenberg served under both Marshall and his successor, Robert A. Lovett. She was the first woman to hold such a high-level DoD position, and Marshall was justly proud of her selection and performance. Marshall also established the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), which first met in September 1951 and continues to function effectively today.

The action in Korea and the military buildup necessitated large increases in the defense budget, a process begun before Marshall entered office. Total obligational authority in FY 1951, roughly coinciding with Marshall's tenure, totaled more than \$45.1 billion, compared with just over \$14 billion the previous year. For FY 1952, beginning on 1 July 1951, TOA skyrocketed to more than \$57 billion, larger than any fiscal year since 1945.

The heaviest fighting during the Korean War took place while Marshall was secretary of defense. General Douglas MacArthur's dramatic landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950 initiated a period of military success for UN forces, which drove deep into North Korea in succeeding weeks until "volunteers" from the People's Republic of China intervened in massive numbers in October and November. The Communists then inflicted heavy losses on UN troops and forced them back into the southern part of the peninsula. Although lines became more or less stabilized by the spring of 1951, generally along the 38th parallel, the fighting continued for another two years. Marshall backed the U.S.-UN limited war objectives to return Korean boundaries to prewar lines, achieve an armistice, and then work for a diplomatic solution.

This approach precipitated the most serious controversy during Marshall's year in the Pentagon. General MacArthur, UN Supreme Commander in Korea, advocated a ground offensive all the way to the Chinese-North Korean border at the Yalu River and the bombing of bridges and supply routes between China and North Korea. Rejecting the concept of limited war, MacArthur believed in fighting for complete victory, even if it meant a major conflict with China and perhaps the Soviet Union. In spite of presidential and DoD directives to refrain, General MacArthur persisted in expressing personal views contradicting official policy. In a 20 March 1951 letter to Joseph W. Martin, House Republican minority leader, MacArthur directly challenged the president's policy, and a few days later, undercutting a UN plan for an armistice and negotiations, he publicly offered to confer personally with the enemy commander to discuss surrender terms.

On 10 April 1951 President Truman relieved MacArthur of all his commands in the Far East. Marshall and the JCS, with whom Truman conferred, agreed with the president's decision. In congressional hearings during May 1951, Marshall testified for seven days. MacArthur's removal, he stated, stemmed from "the wholly unprecedented position of a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure at and his disagreement with the foreign and military policy of the United States." Some MacArthur supporters and Truman political opponents bitterly criticized Marshall for his role in these events. In June 1951 Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, who had earlier accused the Truman administration of harboring communists, spoke for three hours in the Senate; he released a 60,000-word document reviewing Marshall's career since 1939 and charging him with leading a conspiracy to sacrifice the United States to the intrigues of the Soviet Union.

Actually, Secretary Marshall devoted himself to improving the defenses of the United States and its allies. He placed great emphasis on collective security, particularly strengthening NATO by deploying more U.S. military forces to Europe. He testified at length in favor of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which consolidated existing foreign aid programs within the framework of one law. The Department of Defense under this law had responsibility for the administration of military assistance to NATO and other nations under the umbrella of the Mutual Security Agency. In Marshall's last month as secretary of defense, the United States concluded three important security treaties: with the Philippines on 30 August 1951, with Australia and New Zealand on 1 September 1951 (the ANZUS Pact), and with Japan on 8 September 1951. This last pact coincided with the signing of a peace treaty between Japan and 48 other nations, marking the official end of the Pacific phase of World War II. In playing a role in the formulation of these treaties, Marshall added to his pioneer work in promoting collective security during his term as secretary of state between 1947 and 1949.

General Marshall informed President Truman when he became secretary of defense that he probably would serve only one year. He accepted the position because of the Korean emergency and the need to restore prestige to the office. Leaving the Pentagon on 12 September 1951, he retired to his country home in Leesburg, Virginia. In December 1953 he received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in the development of the Marshall Plan and his other contributions to international peace and understanding. General Marshall died at Walter

Reed Army Hospital in Washington on 16 October 1959, and was interred in Arlington National Cemetery. Although sometimes controversial and subject to political attack in the latter years of his

public service, Marshall has been recognized as an effective and influential secretary of defense and indeed as one of the most significant leaders of the United States in the twentieth century.

Robert A. Lovett (1951-1953)

Because Robert A. Lovett served as deputy secretary of defense under Marshall, he was thoroughly familiar with the duties and responsibilities of his new office when President Truman selected him to succeed the general. The son of a judge, Lovett was born in Huntsville, Texas, on 14 September 1895. He graduated from Yale University in 1918 and took postgraduate courses in law and business administration at Harvard University between 1919 and 1921. During World War I Lovett went overseas as a naval ensign. He flew for a time with the British Naval Air Service on patrol and combat missions and then commanded a U.S. naval air squadron, rising to the rank of lieutenant commander.

Lovett began his business career as a clerk at the National Bank of Commerce in New York and later moved to Brown Brothers Harriman and Company, where he eventually became a partner and a prominent member of the New York business community. As a civilian he remained interested in aeronautics, especially in European commercial and military aviation. In December 1940 Lovett accepted appointment as special assistant to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and four months later became assistant secretary of war for air. He served with distinction, overseeing the massive expansion of the Army Air Forces and the procurement of huge numbers of aircraft during the war. In awarding Lovett the Distinguished Service Medal in September 1945, President Truman wrote: "He has truly been the eyes, ears and hands of the Secretary of War in respect to the growth of that enormous American airpower which has astonished the world and played such a large part in bringing the war to a speedy and successful conclusion."

After leaving the War Department in December 1945 Lovett returned to Brown Brothers Harriman, only to be called back to Washington a little more than a year later to serve with General Marshall as under secretary of state. Lovett went back to his investment business in January 1949, but Marshall



insisted that he join him again when he took over at the Pentagon in September 1950. As deputy secretary of defense, Lovett played a critical role in the management of the department; his appointment as secretary, made on Marshall's recommendation, received wide praise.

When Lovett became secretary of defense, the end of the Korean War was not yet in sight. Thus the long-range rearmament program continued to be one of his main concerns. Like Marshall, Lovett believed that the United States erred seriously at the end of World War II: "We did not just demobilize . . . we just disintegrated." As secretary of defense he designed a rearmament program that was intended both to meet the demands of the Korean conflict and to serve as a deterrent and mobilization base in future military

emergencies. As Lovett put it, "Heretofore this country has only had two throttle settings—one, wide-open for war, and the other, tight-shut for peace. What we are really trying to do is to find a cruising speed."

Lovett therefore argued for budgets large enough to carry on the Korean conflict and to improve U.S. defensive strength. His main budget effort during his 16 months in office was to secure adequate funds for FY 1953. Lovett eventually reduced initial service requests of about \$71 billion to \$49 billion, which the president and the Bureau of the Budget cut further to \$48.6 billion, the amount requested of Congress. Lovett argued strenuously against additional congressional cuts, emphasizing the need to expand Army, Navy, and Marine Corps forces and to work toward a goal of 143 Air Force wings (as compared with 95 then authorized). Lovett did not get all that he wanted. Actual TOA for FY 1953 came to about \$44.2 billion, almost \$13 billion less than the previous year.

Lovett's efforts to meet rearmament and preparedness goals suffered in 1952 from a major dispute between the federal government and the steel industry. Truman tried to avert a threatened strike, caused mainly by a wage dispute, by taking over the mills in April 1952. The strike occurred after the Supreme Court overruled Truman's seizure order. Lovett supported Truman's action as essential to maintaining defense production and expressed serious concern about the strike's effects on the nation's military capabilities. Even so, he noted that "the last six months of 1952 saw the most significant increases in the military effectiveness of the United States since the beginning of partial mobilization." By the end of the Truman administration, the Defense Department had met successfully the challenges of the Korean War mobilization and embarked on a long-term preparedness effort.

Besides the preparedness issue, Lovett inherited a number of other matters that were still unresolved in the early 1950s, including the proper military role of nuclear weapons. In 1951 Sen. Brien McMahon of Connecticut led the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in endorsing a resolution urging DoD to expand the atomic weapons program. Lovett noted that the department accorded such weapons a prominent place in its planning and budget requests. His proposal for increased funds for the Air Force, in fact, recognized that aircraft represented "the most efficient method of delivery" of atomic weapons. But he warned against premature reliance on them: "There is no

new, inexpensive, or magic way to win wars in the near future. We must be able to defend ourselves and to win battles with tested, available armaments Any premature adoption of the most modern but untried weapons and devices could lead to possible disaster."

Lovett's stands on the nuclear weapons question and other major military issues generally followed those of his predecessors. He strongly supported universal military training, regarding it as the only viable long-term approach to building a reserve force, thus allowing a smaller active military establishment. A firm proponent of NATO, he played an important role when the NATO Council in February 1952 adopted force goals totaling 50 divisions and 4,000 aircraft to be achieved at the end of 1952. Lovett endorsed enthusiastically the council's decision to admit Turkey and Greece as new NATO members. He supported the Mutual Security Program, viewing it as an important and integral part of the U.S. defense effort and as vital to future NATO effectiveness. "The only alternative to mutual security," he argued, "is to attempt unilateral security," an approach that would require a tremendous commitment in manpower and funds without guaranteeing the nation's security.

Despite a relatively smooth administration, Lovett felt a growing dissatisfaction with the existing defense organization. Although he recognized that real unification could result only from an evolutionary process and not legislative edict, as the end of his term approached he discerned the need for changes in the National Security Act beyond those made in 1949. Commenting about unification at a press conference a week before he left office, Lovett observed that the Department of Defense would have to be reorganized substantially if the United States became involved in "a major global and full-out effort." Lovett put forward his recommendations in a long letter to President Truman on 18 November 1952. Among other things, he proposed clarification of the secretary of defense's relationship to the president, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military departments; redefinition of JCS functions; reorganization of the military departments; and reorganization and redefinition of the functions of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board.

Lovett meant his recommendations for practical consideration by his successor, and they indeed played an important role in the formulation of a reorganization plan during the early months of the Eisenhower administration. Concerned about the need for an orderly post-election changeover in the

Department of Defense, Lovett met several times during the transition period with the incoming secretary, Charles E. Wilson, and made sure that he was thoroughly briefed on current issues.

After Secretary Lovett left office on 20 January 1953, he returned again to Brown Brothers Harriman, where he remained active as a general partner for many years. Robert Lovett has been


recognized as one of the most capable administrators to hold the office of secretary of defense and as a perceptive critic of defense organization. His work in completing the Korean War mobilization and in planning and implementing the long-range rearmament program, as well as his proposals to restructure the Department of Defense, were among his major contributions.

Charles E. Wilson (1953-1957)

The election of 1952 brought to the White House Dwight D. Eisenhower, one of the nation's best known and most respected military leaders. His choice for secretary of defense, Charles E. Wilson, had achieved notable success as a business executive. As Eisenhower was superbly equipped, and inclined, to give close personal attention to national security affairs, the new secretary was expected to concentrate on defense management rather than formulation of basic national security policy.

Wilson was born on 18 July 1890 in Minerva, Ohio. After earning a degree in electrical engineering from the Carnegie Institute of Technology in 1909, he joined the Westinghouse Electric Company in Pittsburgh, where eventually he supervised the engineering of automobile electrical equipment, and during World War I, the development of dynamotors and radio generators for the Army and Navy. In 1919, Wilson moved to Remy Electric, a General Motors subsidiary, as chief engineer and sales manager. By January 1941 he was the president of General Motors. During World War II, Wilson directed General Motors' huge defense production effort, which earned him a U.S. Medal of Merit in 1946. He was still head of General Motors when President Eisenhower selected him as secretary of defense in January 1953.

Wilson's nomination sparked a major controversy during his confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, specifically over his large stockholdings in General Motors. Reluctant to sell the stock, valued at more than \$2.5 million, Wilson agreed to do so under committee pressure. During the hearings, when asked if as secretary of defense he could make a decision adverse to the interests of General Motors, Wilson answered affirmatively but added that he could not



conceive of such a situation "because for years I thought what was good for the country was good for General Motors and vice versa." Later this statement was often garbled when quoted, suggesting that Wilson had said simply, "What's good for General Motors is good for the country." Although finally approved by a Senate vote of 77-6, Wilson began his duties in the Pentagon with his standing somewhat diminished by the confirmation debate.

Both Wilson and Eisenhower entered office committed to reorganizing the Department of Defense. In February 1953 Wilson appointed a

Committee on Department of Defense Organization, which made extensive recommendations in its report of 11 April 1953. The committee, chaired by Nelson A. Rockefeller, issued an important legal opinion designed to clarify the power and authority of the secretary of defense. The opinion held that the secretary statutorily had "full and complete authority . . . over the Department of Defense, all its agencies, subdivisions, and personnel," including the service secretaries and the JCS. By designating the secretary of defense as "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense," Congress had bestowed on him powers greater than those normally granted the head of an executive department.

President Eisenhower incorporated the Rockefeller recommendations in Reorganization Plan No. 6, transmitted to Congress on 30 April 1953. In an accompanying message he listed the changes proposed in the official plan, explained several that he was making by executive direction, and outlined three central objectives of defense organization: "a clear unchallenged civilian responsibility in the Defense Establishment," "effectiveness with economy," and "the best possible military plans." With reference to the first objective, the president asked Secretary Wilson to revise the 1948 Key West agreement to eliminate the provision whereby the JCS designated one of their members as executive agent for each unified command. Under the revised directive formally issued in March 1954, the secretary of defense would designate a military department as executive agent for a unified command, making it clear that "the channel of responsibility and authority to a commander of a unified command will unmistakably be from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the designated civilian Secretary of a military department."

The formal reorganization plan dealt directly with the second and third objectives. In regard to the second, Reorganization Plan No. 6 abolished four DoD entities—the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, the Defense Supply Management Agency, and the office of Director of Installations—and replaced them with six additional assistant secretaries of defense, each with functions prescribed by the secretary of defense. The plan also authorized the appointment of a general counsel as the chief legal officer of the Department of Defense.

To help meet the third goal, the reorganization plan transferred from the JCS collectively to its chairman responsibility for management of the

Joint Staff. Furthermore, the JCS chairman was to approve the chiefs' selection of members of the Joint Staff, and the secretary of defense was to confirm the appointment by the JCS of the director of the Joint Staff. President Eisenhower explained that these changes were designed "to place upon the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff greater responsibility for organizing and directing the subordinate structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in such a way as to help the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff discharge their total responsibilities."

In July 1954, Wilson issued a directive on the JCS to complement the 1953 reorganization. Its most important provision stated that "the Joint Staff work of each of the Chiefs of Staff shall take priority over all other duties"—namely their tasks as chiefs of individual services. The directive also clarified the role of the JCS chairman and his authority over the Joint Staff while making clear that assignment of major tasks to the Joint Staff was the prerogative of the full JCS.

Secretary Wilson welcomed Reorganization Plan No. 6, which became effective on 30 June 1953, as facilitating more efficient management of the Department of Defense. He looked on the assistant secretaries as his "vice presidents" and tried to run the Pentagon like an industrial corporation. Wilson took advantage of the reorganization to decentralize administration, giving the service secretaries more responsibility and importance. In his first annual report, he noted that the service secretaries "were his principal assistants The decentralization of operational responsibility . . . to the Secretaries of the Military Departments will make possible the effective exercise of civilian authority throughout the defense establishment." Wilson also endeavored to work closely with the JCS.

Internal reorganization was only one of several major changes during Wilson's tenure. In the policy realm came the "New Look" defense concept. Eisenhower had criticized the Truman policies during the 1952 campaign, arguing that they were merely reactive rather than positive and that they forced the United States to compete with the Soviet Union on terms laid down by the Russians. The president entered office with strong convictions about the need to reorient the nation's security policy, convictions reflecting his interest in maintaining a staunch defense while cutting government expenditures and balancing the budget.

The president inaugurated planning for the New Look in July 1953 by asking the newly-chosen

members of the JCS—Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman; General Matthew B. Ridgway, Army chief of staff; General Nathan F. Twining, Air Force chief of staff; and Admiral Robert B. Carney, chief of naval operations—to prepare a paper on overall defense policy. Although the chiefs' paper did not recommend any fundamental changes, the National Security Council in October 1953 adopted a key tenet of the New Look—that a large-scale limited war or a general war would likely be fought with nuclear weapons. Eisenhower formally presented the New Look in his State of the Union message in January 1954 and Secretary Wilson helped to explain it. "There is no fallacy in the idea of more defense for less money," he said. Employing "new weapons and techniques, and effective planning for ready reserves of both men and materiel," the United States could support capable military forces "within the dollars that the people of our country through their Congress are willing to make available for this purpose."

The major features of the New Look included (1) greater reliance on nuclear weapons, utilizing the advantage the United States had over the Soviet Union in such weapons; (2) elevation of strategic air power, the major means to deliver nuclear weapons, to a more important position (not an expansion in the number of Air Force wings but rather development and production of better equipment); (3) cuts in conventional ground forces, based both on reliance on strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and the expectation that U.S. allies would provide ground troops for their own defense; (4) an expanded program of continental defense, which, along with strategic air power, would serve as a principal ingredient of the New Look's deterrence program; and (5) modernization and enlargement of reserve forces, enhancing the military manpower base while reducing active duty forces.

Although the Eisenhower administration generally adhered to the New Look throughout Wilson's term, the policy remained controversial. Some critics maintained that it made impossible the fighting of a limited non-nuclear war. The Army and Navy felt that the increased emphasis on air power and nuclear weapons represented a departure from the concept of "balanced forces," where individual service programs were balanced against overall requirements. Implicit in the policy was rejection of the idea that a "year of crisis" with the Soviet Union was imminent (to occur when the Soviets achieved offensive nuclear capability against the United States) or that a general war was just around the corner. Wilson

pointed out frequently that defense policy should be long-term and not based on short-range projections of Soviet-American relations. "Military expenditures," he observed, "must be adequate, but not so great that they will become an intolerable burden which will harm the social and economic fabric of our country. True security cannot be founded on arms and arms alone."

Wilson worked hard to reduce the defense budget. This meant some immediate cutbacks in FY 1953 funds and a concerted effort to economize in subsequent years. Total obligational authority approved by Congress during Wilson's term decreased significantly at first and then began to creep back up, but remained lower than the Truman administration's last budgets (which were of course inflated because of the Korean conflict). Truman's final defense TOA, for FY 1953, was \$44.2 billion. TOA in subsequent fiscal years was as follows: 1954, \$30.4 billion; 1955, \$33.7 billion; 1956, \$38.06 billion; 1957, \$39.7 billion; and 1958, \$41.1 billion. Especially after 1954, when the Democrats gained control of Congress, the Wilson-Eisenhower effort to curb defense expenditures provoked growing criticism. The Air Force, even though the New Look enhanced its role, opposed the decision to cut back from the Truman goal of 143 wings, and its congressional supporters tried repeatedly, sometimes successfully, to appropriate more money for air power than the administration wanted. The other services, especially the Army, objected to force reductions ordained by the New Look. Both General Ridgway, who retired as army chief of staff in June 1955, and his successor, General Maxwell D. Taylor, believed that the Army was receiving too small a share of the military budget.

Its standing threatened by the New Look, the Army questioned the wisdom of reliance on "massive retaliation" and strategic air power to the neglect of other force elements. Secretary Wilson reportedly observed that the United States "can't afford to fight limited wars. We can only afford to fight a big war, and if there is one, that is the kind it will be." But by 1955 the Army, and later in the decade the Navy, departed from their traditional emphasis on preparation for total war by urging the need to prepare for limited war—non-global conflicts restricted in geographical area, force size, and weapons (although tactical nuclear weapons were not ruled out). Generals Ridgway and Taylor stressed the need to have a variety of forces available and equipped to fight different kinds of war—from a local non-nuclear war to a global strategic nuclear conflict. They rejected the notion

that limited wars would occur only in less-developed areas and argued that such conflicts might occur in the NATO region as well as in other locations.

The Army received indirect support from such critics of massive retaliation as Bernard Brodie, William W. Kaufmann, and Henry A. Kissinger, who noted that the United States and the Soviet Union had or were acquiring the power to destroy each other with strategic nuclear weapons, thus precluding their rational use in response to a limited attack. Taylor, concluding that the Soviet Union and the United States had achieved mutual nuclear deterrence, believed that "limited-war forces had the active role to play in future military operations, the atomic retaliatory forces a passive role." The Army did move into missile and space programs in an effort to preserve for itself a part in planning for and fighting a nuclear war, but in the late 1950s it continued to push for adoption of a new national security policy which acknowledged the primacy of limited war. While the Eisenhower administration did not adopt the Army's position, by the time Wilson left office it did accept both the need to prepare for limited war and the idea that deterrence of a direct attack on U.S. interests required "sufficient" rather than "superior" retaliatory capability.

The increased competition among the services resulting from the New Look compelled Secretary Wilson to deal with the perennially troublesome question of service roles and missions, complicated now, too, by the introduction of new weapons, especially missiles. Wilson noted in his semiannual report at the end of FY 1956 that the services, which had eight categories of guided missiles available for various tasks, could not agree on their respective roles and missions in relation to these and other planned missile systems. Also at issue were aircraft types for the individual services and Air Force tactical support for the Army. To address these and other nagging questions, Wilson issued two important documents. The first, a memorandum to members of the Armed Forces Policy Council on 26 November 1956, dealt with five points of contention. First, Wilson limited the Army to small aircraft with specifically defined functions within combat zones. On the matter of airlift adequacy, which the Army questioned, the secretary declared that current Air Force practices were acceptable. As to air defense, the Army received responsibility for point defense—of specified geographical areas, vital installations, and cities; the Air Force became responsible for area defense—the interception of enemy attacks away

from individual vital installations; and the Navy could maintain ship-based air defense weapon systems. Wilson assigned to the Air Force primary responsibility for tactical support for the Army, although the Army could use surface-to-surface missiles for close support of its field operations. Finally, the secretary gave the Air Force sole authority to operate land-based intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) systems and the Navy the same responsibility for ship-based IRBMs. He enjoined the Army from planning operational employment of missiles with ranges beyond 200 miles.

On 18 March 1957, Wilson issued a directive to clarify his earlier decisions on the Army-Air Force use of aircraft for tactical purposes. There were no major changes from the previous division of responsibility; rather, he provided a more detailed and specific listing of those functional areas for which the Army could procure its own aircraft and those for which it would rely on the Air Force.

Although Wilson found it necessary to clarify service roles and missions, he did not press for extensive further unification of the armed forces. He did establish in February 1956 an office of special assistant to the secretary of defense for guided missiles but made few other changes after implementation of Reorganization Plan No. 6 in 1953. When asked in 1957 about persistent demands for further unification, Wilson responded: "It's an oversimplification in the false hope that you could thus wash out the problems if you put the people all in the same uniform and that then they wouldn't disagree over what should be done. Of course, they would."

Wilson, a folksy, honest, and outspoken man, sometimes got into trouble because of casual remarks. In January 1957, for example, he referred to enlistees in the National Guard during the Korean War as "draft dodgers." This caused a storm of protest and even brought a rebuke from the president, who said he thought Wilson had made "a very . . . unwise statement, without stopping to think what it meant." On another occasion, Wilson jokingly referred to the White House as a "dung hill," generating further controversy. These episodes should not detract from recognition of Wilson's determined efforts to run the Department of Defense efficiently and to maintain the nation's security forces within reasonable budget guidelines.

Wilson indicated his intention to retire from office shortly after the start of the second Eisenhower term and left on 8 October 1957. Eisenhower noted when Wilson stepped down that

under him "the strength of our security forces has not only been maintained but has been significantly increased" and that he had managed the Defense Department "in a manner consistent with the requirements of a strong, healthy national

economy." After he left the Pentagon, Wilson returned to Michigan, where he devoted his time to business and family affairs. He died at the age of 71 on 26 September 1961.

Neil H. McElroy (1957-1959)

On 4 October 1957, just four days before Wilson left office, the Soviet Union launched the world's first satellite (Sputnik I) into orbit. Sputnik's powerful rocket booster suggested that the Soviets were ahead of the United States in missile development. This event, which raised important questions about the U.S. defense program, served as a backdrop to the swearing in, on 9 October 1957, of Neil H. McElroy as secretary of defense.

Born in Berea, Ohio, on 30 October 1904, of schoolteacher parents, McElroy grew up in the Cincinnati area. After receiving a bachelor's degree in economics from Harvard in 1925, he returned to Cincinnati to work in the advertising department of the Procter and Gamble Company. He advanced rapidly up the managerial ladder and became company president in 1948. Although a well-known businessman, McElroy's only experience in the federal government prior to 1957 had been as chairman of the White House Conference on Education in 1955-56. With a background similar to Wilson's, and given President Eisenhower's predominance in defense matters, McElroy's appointment was not unusual. He spelled out his mandate the day he assumed office: "I conceive the role of the Secretary of Defense to be that of captain of President Eisenhower's defense team."

The launching of Sputnik I and a second Soviet satellite a month later prevented McElroy from easing into his duties at a deliberate pace. To meet the concern generated by the sputniks, McElroy attempted both to clarify the relative positions of the United States and the Soviet Union in missile development and to speed up the U.S. effort. Placing considerable emphasis on the intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) the United States then had under development, McElroy argued that with proper deployment in overseas locations they would serve as effectively as Soviet intercontinental range ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Without waiting for completion of final tests and evaluations, McElroy ordered the Air



Force THOR and Army JUPITER IRBMs into production and planned to begin their deployment in the United Kingdom before the end of 1958 and on the European continent shortly thereafter. McElroy also ordered accelerated development of the Navy solid-fuel POLARIS IRBM and the Air Force liquid-fuel ATLAS and TITAN ICBMs. In February 1958 he authorized the Air Force to begin development of the MINUTEMAN, a solid-fuel ICBM to be deployed in hardened underground silos, with operational status expected in the early 1960s.

McElroy did not believe that the sputnik success represented a major change in the world's military balance, but he acknowledged that it had a significant impact on world public opinion. The launching of the sputniks indicated that "the

Soviet Union is farther advanced scientifically than many had realized" and that "the weapons of the future may be a great deal closer upon us than we had thought, and therefore the ultimate survival of the Nation depends more than ever before on the speed and skill with which we can pursue the development of advanced weapons." McElroy had to spend much time explaining the missile programs and trying to allay congressional anxiety about a so-called "missile gap" between the United States and the Soviet Union.

McElroy shared some responsibility for the missile gap controversy. When asked whether the United States was behind the Russians in the satellite and missile fields, he responded, "I would say that it seems rather obvious that we are behind the Russians." Later he qualified his statement by noting that while the Soviet Union was ahead in satellites, it was not necessarily ahead in missiles, and he repeatedly pointed out that U.S. IRBMs deployed overseas were just as much a threat to the Soviet Union as Soviet ICBMs deployed in Russia were to the United States. But charges of a missile gap persisted. When he left office in December 1959 McElroy stated that the two nations had about the same number of ICBMs, but that if the USSR built missiles up to its capacity and the United States built those it planned to build, the Soviet Union would probably have more missiles than the United States during the 1961-63 period. The missile gap debate lasted throughout the rest of Eisenhower's term and became a major issue in the presidential campaign of 1960.

In some measure the Soviet sputniks may have hastened the major Defense reorganization of 1958. Additional experience, as well as scientific and technological advances radically changing the nature of warfare, prompted continuing study of defense management. The second Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, in its 1955 "Report on Business Organization of the Department of Defense," made more than 350 recommendations on departmental operations, most of which DoD implemented by 1958. Early in 1958 a Rockefeller Brothers Fund study, *International Security: The Military Aspect*, recommended organizational changes designed to "correct the inefficiency and duplication of effort growing out of interservice rivalry." Soon after the sputnik launchings in 1957 President Eisenhower publicly noted the need to place antimissile and related programs under a single manager outside the military services. Accordingly, on 7 February 1958 McElroy announced the establishment of the Advanced

Research Projects Agency (ARPA) within OSD. In part intended to eliminate service competition and duplication, ARPA was responsible for the research and early development of antimissile-satellite projects, prior to their assignment to an individual service for eventual deployment.

Emphasizing the dual need to "ensure our safety through strength" and to build "genuine peace," President Eisenhower listed defense reorganization first among eight priority action items in his State of the Union message in January 1958. "The first need," the president declared, "is to assure ourselves that military organization facilitates rather than hinders the functioning of the military establishment in maintaining the security of the nation." Working closely with McElroy, the White House sent its reorganization bill to Congress in April and it became law on 6 August 1958. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the last comprehensive revision to date of the Defense Department's structure, continued the pattern established by the 1949 amendments and the 1953 reorganization plan in clarifying and strengthening the authority of the secretary of defense.

What McElroy described as "the heart and soul" of the Reorganization Act was a significant revision of the unified and specified command structure which in effect substituted the JCS for the military department secretaries in the chain of command, in practice abolishing the executive agent system. The new law also clarified the command authority of specified and unified commanders. In addition the JCS chairman received more authority and prerogatives, and he was no longer denied the right to vote in JCS meetings. To help the JCS carry out their expanded operational duties, the law increased the Joint Staff from 210 to 400 officers. At the same time, at the direction of the president and with the approval of the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs replaced the old JCS committee system, which encouraged service parochialism, with seven directorates, designed to operate closely with the service staffs and the unified commands.

The 1958 law added importantly to the powers of the secretary of defense. He could now transfer, reassign, abolish, and consolidate functions "to provide . . . for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and operation and to eliminate duplication" unless specifically overruled by either house of Congress. He could also "assign, or reassign, to one or more departments or services, the development and operational use of new weapons or weapons systems." He could

create agencies or other organizations "for the carrying out of any supply or service activity common to more than one military department" The Reorganization Act of 1958 read that "each military department . . . shall be separately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense." These provisions and others shifted power to the secretary of defense and diminished the prerogatives of the military departments.

Finally, the 1958 law established the position of director of defense research and engineering (DDR&E), to rank sixth in the Department of Defense, after the secretary, deputy secretary, and the service secretaries. The R&E director was to be the secretary's principal adviser on scientific and technical matters, supervise all research and engineering in DoD, and direct and control research and engineering activities requiring centralized management. The rapid technological changes in weapon systems in the late 1950s made necessary the creation of this position. McElroy explained to a House committee the need for central direction in this sphere: "The weapons of the future often defy classification in terms of traditional military roles. . . . We cannot depend solely on the individual services among them somehow to conceive and develop weapons which may not fall within the established military mission of any one service, but may have vast importance to our security some years from now."

The Reorganization Act of 1958 thus significantly affected the evolution of DoD organization and the role of the secretary. McElroy considered the most important aspects of the 1958 reorganization to be the replacement of service executive agents by the JCS in directing the unified commands and the creation of a strong director of defense research and engineering.

Although the Eisenhower administration maintained a determined interest in controlling expenditures and balancing the budget, McElroy did not

place economy above preparedness. A strong supporter of military assistance, he argued effectively for continued congressional and public support for the program. "Military Assistance," he said, "is to the defense of our Country as fire prevention is to fire fighting. You can have the best, most modern sprinkling system in your factory but it will be useless if you don't take steps to prevent fires from getting out of control before they reach your plant." Nonetheless, he presided over a budget that remained stringent. In spite of public concern about preparedness in the wake of the sputnik success and pressures from Democratic critics to spend more money, the Eisenhower administration did not panic. While it shifted some expenditure priorities, especially toward missile development, production, and deployment, it supported no drastic increase in the defense budget. The president and Secretary McElroy contended that the budget was adequate to insure the nation's security. For the McElroy term, the Defense Department's total obligational authority by fiscal year was as follows: 1958, \$41.1 billion; 1959, \$42.1 billion; and 1960, \$40.2 billion.

When McElroy acceded to Eisenhower's request in 1957 that he become secretary of defense, he limited his availability to about two years. Although there was criticism on the grounds that the secretary would leave just as he learned the job, McElroy confirmed early in 1959 that he would resign before the end of the year. Speculation that Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles would succeed him ended with Quarles's death in May 1959. Secretary of the Navy Thomas S. Gates, Jr., succeeded Quarles, and when McElroy's resignation became effective on 1 December 1959, Gates replaced him. Actually, McElroy served longer as secretary of defense than any of his predecessors except Wilson. When he left the Pentagon, McElroy became chairman of the board of Procter and Gamble. He died on 30 November 1972 in Cincinnati.

Thomas S. Gates, Jr. (1959-1961)

Gates was sworn in as secretary of defense on an interim appointment on 2 December 1959 and confirmed by the Senate on 26 January 1960. He was born in Germantown, Pennsylvania, on 10

April 1906, the son of an investment banker who served at one time as president of the University of Pennsylvania. Gates graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1928, then joined the in-



vestment banking firm of Drexel and Company in Philadelphia and became a partner in 1940. During World War II he served in the Navy, rose to the rank of lieutenant commander, and participated in campaigns in the Pacific and Mediterranean areas. He was released from active duty in October 1945.

President Eisenhower appointed Gates under secretary of the navy in October 1953 and secretary on 1 April 1957. During this period Gates strove to build up the Navy's fleet and strengthen its organization. It was a foregone conclusion when Gates became McElroy's deputy on 8 June 1959 that he would succeed him. He entered office with an impressive background of personal military experience and more than six years in the Department of Defense.

As a top-level DoD official since 1953, Gates was familiar with the 1953 and 1958 changes in Defense organization. Believing that the secretary of defense had all the authority he needed and that time should be allowed for evaluation of the long-range effects of the 1958 amendments, he discouraged efforts to further revamp the department. As a former secretary of the navy who had observed the gradual downgrading of service secretary positions, he did feel that the service secretaries should play a more important role, and he encouraged them in this direction.

Gates cultivated a good working relationship

with the JCS. Less than a month after becoming secretary, he reminded the chiefs of their responsibility to apprise him of disputes and proposed to meet with them on such questions in order to expedite settlement or bring the issue to the president's attention for final resolution. Soon Gates and the JCS met on a regular basis, not just in instances when the chiefs disagreed. Congressional and other sources applauded Gates for taking the initiative in improving both the JCS organization and the secretary's relations with it.

Another important Gates initiative was the creation in August 1960 of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS). Previously, inadequate Strategic Air Command and Navy coordination of targeting plans led to redundancy and disputed priorities. These differences became especially significant with the advent of the Navy's sea-based POLARIS ballistic missiles. Acting on a proposal by the SAC commander in chief, General Thomas S. Power, that SAC control strategic weapons targeting, Gates set up the JSTPS. The SAC commander, supported by an integrated joint staff, assumed separate duties as director of strategic target planning, to be, as Gates indicated, "the planning agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing and keeping up to date the detailed plans which are necessary." When Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, chief of naval operations, objected to the new arrangement, Gates encouraged him to argue his case with President Eisenhower, who ultimately upheld Gates's decision. Thereafter Burke supported the JSTPS and assigned to it highly qualified naval officers. By December 1960 the JSTPS had prepared the first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), which specified for various attack options the timing, weapons, delivery systems, and targets to be used by U.S. strategic forces.

Gates devoted more time than Wilson and McElroy to the development of basic defense policy, an area in which the president remained dominant. While no radical departure from the New Look approach occurred, the changing nature of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the related assumed need for continental defense systems, and the pressing question of how to respond to local or "limited" wars, dictated a gradual shift in defense policy. As Gates pointed out at a congressional hearing in January 1960, the two principal U.S. defense objectives were "to deter the outbreak of general war by maintaining and improving our present capability to retaliate with devastating effectiveness in case of a major attack upon us or our allies" and "to maintain,

together with our allies, a capability to apply to local situations the degree of force necessary to deter local wars, or to win or contain them promptly if they do break out." Gates saw no clear distinction between general war and limited war forces. As he put it, "All forces are a deterrent to and would be employed in a general war. Most of our forces could be employed in a limited war, if required." He noted as an example that aircraft carriers "are probably the country's best limited war capability; initially because they are deployed in the world's trouble zones and they have on-the-spot ability to react"; yet, he added, they could contribute to the strategic offensive forces during general war.

During Gates's term two missile elements—the ICBM and the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—joined the manned bomber to form a "triad" of strategic nuclear delivery systems. Also during this period, there was movement toward greater emphasis on counterforce—targeting a potential enemy's military installations and forces. As Gates observed, "We are not basing our requirements on just bombing Russia for retaliation purposes." Not only was the United States developing or beginning to deploy a variety of missile systems during this period—ATLAS, TITAN, MINUTEMAN, and POLARIS—but so was the Soviet Union. The USSR's emphasis on the land-based ICBM rather than the manned bomber as its primary strategic delivery system presaged a threat of such magnitude to the United States that, together with the sputnik shock, it forced an acceleration in the pace of U.S. missile development.

Gates, like McElroy, had to contend with the "missile gap" controversy. He regarded it as a false issue, based on the failure of missile gap believers to distinguish between space and military programs. When the U.S. long-range ballistic missile program began in the early 1950s, Gates observed, the development of small, lightweight nuclear warheads by American scientists made it possible for smaller ballistic missiles to carry them. The Russians, on the other hand, concentrated on very large boosters which they used to launch space satellites earlier than the United States. Gates told a House committee, "We are not behind the Russians in our military effort overall. . . . It is one thing to admit you are behind in the ability to put big payloads in space for which we have at the moment no military requirement, and another thing to admit that we are behind in our total military posture." Gates conceded that the Soviets might have more strategic missiles than the United States for a few years,

perhaps peaking in 1962, but he denied that there was a real missile or deterrent gap; the Soviets would not "gain a strategic posture which might tempt them to initiate a surprise attack." (Gates based his thinking in part on a debatable approach to intelligence estimates, which took account of Soviet intentions as well as capabilities, leading to the conclusion that the disparity between the number of Soviet and U.S. missiles by 1962 or 1963 would not be as great as estimated during the McElroy period.)

Like all of his predecessors, Gates supported U.S. participation in collective security pacts and military assistance programs. He identified NATO as the nucleus of the U.S. "forward strategy." As he put it, "Should we ever abandon our forward strategy in favor of the so-called 'Fortress America' concept, we would retreat forever." He urged Congress to continue adequate funding for military assistance, which had brought "optimum dividends" for the money spent.

Perhaps the most spectacular event of Gates's administration occurred on 1 May 1960 when the Soviet Union shot down over its territory a U-2 aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers. When Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced the incident four days later and accused the United States of spying, the Eisenhower administration initially suggested that the plane might have strayed into Soviet airspace. On the recommendation of representatives from State and Defense, including Gates, President Eisenhower later admitted that the U-2 was on an intelligence-gathering mission (actually under CIA control) and assumed responsibility for the flight. In mid-May Gates accompanied Eisenhower to Paris for a summit meeting, which had been scheduled prior to the U-2 affair. There Khrushchev demanded termination of all U.S. flights over the Soviet Union, an apology, and punishment of those responsible. Eisenhower indicated that the flights would not be resumed but rejected the other demands, whereupon Khrushchev refused to proceed with the summit meeting. Gates suggested later that the Russian leader used the U-2 crisis to abort a meeting which he had determined in advance would not result in gains for the Soviet Union.

On the eve of the summit conference, Gates ordered a worldwide alert of U.S. military communications facilities—a decision criticized by some as provocative. Stoutly defending his action, Gates later explained that he decided, with the concurrence of Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, to call the alert when he became aware of the belligerent position Khrushchev

intended to take when the summit convened the next day. "Under the circumstances," Gates said, "it seemed most prudent to me to increase the awareness of our unified commanders. Moreover, since the command and individuals concerned in the decision process, including the President, the Secretary of State, and myself, were overseas, it was important to check out our military communications."

Although Gates adhered to the usual budget posture and strategy of the Eisenhower administration, there was 8.6 percent real growth in DoD's FY 1961 budget after Congress completed its work. Total obligational authority amounted to \$44.6 billion, almost \$4.4 billion over the previous year. The bulk of the increase went to the Navy and the Air Force, which received additions of more than 9.1 percent and 10.9 percent respectively. Gates pressed for an appropriation of \$2 billion for military assistance, most of which Congress provided. To criticism of the Eisenhower administration's continuing efforts to hold down the defense budget, Gates replied that the department was spending enough money to meet the nation's vital security needs.

In a lengthy statement entitled "Department of Defense, 1953-1960," prepared at the close of Gates's tenure, the Department of Defense summarized its program principles and accomplishments during the Eisenhower years, concluding that "today our armed forces have the greatest striking power in our history—many times greater than in 1953." Among the accomplishments cited were: development of medium- and long-range bombers (including the B-52s put into service during the 1950s) and ICBMs; installation of a continental defense system—the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW), the Ballistic Missile Early Warning

System (BMEWS), and Nike surface-to-air missile systems; production of several nuclear submarines, beginning with the *Nautilus* in 1954, and *Forrestal*-type carriers; and creation of the Defense Communications Agency.


Gates retired from office on 20 January 1961. In a sense he was the first of a new breed of secretaries of defense who would take a more active management approach—illustrated by his regular meetings with the JCS and establishment of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. Gates, of course, had the advantages of long prior service in DoD and the expanded authority of the office resulting from the 1953 and 1958 reorganizations. Although President Eisenhower continued to be, as during the Wilson and McElroy periods, the chief formulator of defense policy and the ultimate decisionmaker, Gates appeared to operate with more authority and independence than his immediate predecessors in areas such as strategic policy and planning. It is notable that there was press speculation after John F. Kennedy's election to the presidency in 1960 that he might include a Republican in his cabinet and that if so, Secretary Gates would be high on the list of possible appointees.

After he left the Pentagon, Gates joined Morgan and Company in New York, later the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, becoming president in 1962 and chairman and chief executive officer in 1965. President Richard M. Nixon appointed him chairman of the Advisory Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, which presented its influential report in November 1969. In 1976-77 he served, with the rank of ambassador, as chief of the United States Liaison Office in the People's Republic of China. He died in Philadelphia at age 76 on 25 March 1983.

Robert S. McNamara (1961-1968)

Defense issues, including the "missile gap," played a prominent role in the campaign of 1960. President-elect Kennedy, very much concerned with defense matters although clearly lacking Eisenhower's mastery of the issues, first offered the post of secretary of defense to former secretary Robert A. Lovett. When Lovett declined, Kennedy chose Robert S. McNamara on Lovett's recommendation.

McNamara was born on 9 June 1916 in San Francisco, where his father was sales manager of a wholesale shoe firm. He graduated in 1937 from the University of California (Berkeley) with a degree in economics and philosophy. In 1939 he earned a master's degree from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, worked a year for the accounting firm of Price, Waterhouse in San Francisco, and then in August



1940 returned to Harvard to teach in the business school. He entered the Army Air Forces as a captain in early 1943 and left active duty three years later with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

In 1946 McNamara joined Ford Motor Company as manager of planning and financial analysis. He advanced rapidly through a series of top-level management positions to the presidency of Ford on 9 November 1960—one day after Kennedy's election. The first company head selected outside the Ford family, McNamara received substantial credit for Ford's expansion and success in the postwar period. Less than five weeks after becoming president at Ford, he accepted Kennedy's invitation to join his cabinet.

Although not especially knowledgeable about defense matters, McNamara immersed himself in the subject, learned quickly, and soon began to apply an "active role" management philosophy, in his own words "providing aggressive leadership—questioning, suggesting alternatives, proposing objectives and stimulating progress." He rejected radical organizational changes, such as those proposed by a group Kennedy appointed, headed by Sen. W. Stuart Symington, which would have abolished the military departments, replaced the JCS with a single chief of staff, and established three functional unified commands. McNamara ac-

cepted the need for separate services but argued that "at the end we must have one defense policy, not three conflicting defense policies. And it is the job of the Secretary and his staff to make sure that this is the case."

Initially, the basic policies outlined by President Kennedy in a message to Congress on 28 March 1961 guided McNamara in the reorientation of the defense program. Kennedy rejected the concept of first-strike attack and emphasized the need for adequate strategic arms and defense to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies. U.S. arms, he maintained, must constantly be under civilian command and control, and the nation's defense posture had to be "designed to reduce the danger of irrational or unpremeditated general war." The primary mission of U.S. overseas forces, in cooperation with allies, was "to prevent the steady erosion of the Free World through limited wars." Kennedy and McNamara rejected massive retaliation for a posture of flexible response. The United States wanted choices in an emergency other than "inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation," as the president put it. Out of a major review of the military challenges confronting the United States initiated by McNamara in 1961 came a decision to increase the nation's limited warfare capabilities.

The Kennedy administration placed particular emphasis on improving the services' ability to counter communist "wars of national liberation," in which the enemy avoided head-on military confrontation and resorted to political subversion and guerrilla tactics. As McNamara said in his 1962 annual report, "The military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush, and the raid. The political tactics are terror, extortion, and assassination." In practical terms, this meant training and equipping U.S. military personnel, as well as such allies as South Vietnam, for counterinsurgency operations. Later in the decade, U.S. forces applied these counterinsurgency techniques with mixed success in Vietnam.

Complementing these special forces preparations was increased attention to conventional strength. The Berlin crisis in 1961 demonstrated to McNamara the need for more troops. In this instance he called up reserves and also proceeded to expand the regular armed forces. Whereas active duty strength had declined from approximately 3,555,000 to 2,484,000 between 1953 (the end of the Korean conflict) and 1961, it increased to nearly 2,808,000 by 30 June 1962. Then the forces leveled off at around 2,700,000 until the Vietnam military

buildup began in 1965, reaching a peak of nearly 3,550,000 by mid-1968, just after McNamara left office.

McNamara played a much larger role in the formulation of nuclear strategy than his predecessors. In part this reflected both the increasing sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and Soviet progress toward nuclear parity with the United States. Central in McNamara's thinking on nuclear policy stood the NATO alliance and the U.S. commitment to defend its members from aggression. In a widely-noticed speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in June 1962, McNamara repeated much of what he had told a NATO ministers' meeting in Athens several weeks earlier, especially about the importance of NATO to U.S. security and the proper response to a surprise Soviet nuclear attack on the Western allies. Basic NATO strategy in such an unlikely event, McNamara argued, should follow the "no-cities" concept. "General nuclear war," he stated, "should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population."

With his principal goal deterrence—to convince Moscow that a nuclear attack against the Western allies would trigger U.S. retaliation against Soviet forces, perhaps eliminating their ability to continue military action—McNamara also wanted to provide the Russians with an incentive to refrain from attacking cities. "The very strength and nature of the Alliance forces," he said in the Ann Arbor speech, "make it possible for us to retain, even in the face of a massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy an enemy society if driven to it."

McNamara soon deemphasized the no-cities approach, for several reasons: public fear that planning to use nuclear weapons in limited ways would make nuclear war seem more feasible; increased Air Force demands, after identifying more targets under the no-cities strategy, for more nuclear weapons; the assumption that such a policy would require major air and missile defense, necessitating a vastly expanded budget; and negative reactions from the Soviets and NATO allies. McNamara turned to "assured destruction," which he characterized as the capability "to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage

upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, even after absorbing a surprise first strike." As specifically defined by McNamara, assured destruction meant that the United States would be able to destroy in retaliation 20 to 25 percent of the Soviet Union's population and 50 percent of its industrial capacity. Later the term "mutual assured destruction" meant the capacity of each side to inflict sufficient damage on the other to constitute an effective deterrent.

McNamara stressed the importance in conjunction with assured destruction of damage limitation—the use of strategic forces to limit damage to the nation's population and industrial capacity by attacking and diminishing the enemy's strategic offensive forces.

To make the new strategy credible, McNamara speeded up the modernization and expansion of weapon and delivery systems. He accelerated production and deployment of the solid-fuel MINUTEMAN ICBM and POLARIS SLBM missiles and by FY 1966 had removed from operational status all of the older liquid-fuel ATLAS and TITAN I missiles. By the end of McNamara's term, the U.S. had deployed 54 TITAN II and 1,000 MINUTEMAN missiles on land, and 656 POLARIS missiles on 41 nuclear submarines. The size of this long-range strategic missile force remained stable until the 1980s, although the number of warheads increased significantly as the MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) system emerged in the late 1960s and the 1970s.

McNamara took other steps to improve U.S. deterrence posture and military capabilities. He raised the number of SAC strategic bombers on 15-minute ground alert from 25 percent to 50 percent, thus lessening their vulnerability to missile attack. In December 1961 he established the Strike Command (STRICOM). Authorized to draw forces when needed from the Strategic Army Corps, the Tactical Air Command, and the airlift units of the Military Air Transport Service and the military services, Strike Command had the mission "to respond swiftly and with whatever force necessary to threats against the peace in any part of the world, reinforcing unified commands or . . . carrying out separate contingency operations." McNamara also increased long-range airlift and sealift capabilities and funds for space research and development. After reviewing the separate and often uncoordinated service efforts in intelligence and communications, McNamara in 1961 consolidated these functions in the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Communications Agency (the latter originally established by Secretary Gates in 1960),

having both report to the secretary of defense through the JCS. In the same year, he set up the Defense Supply Agency to work toward unified supply procurement, distribution, and inventory management.

McNamara's institution of systems analysis as a basis for making key decisions on force requirements, weapon systems, and other matters caused much dissension. Two of its main practitioners during the McNamara era, Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, described the concept as follows: "First, the word 'systems' indicates that every decision should be considered in as broad a context as necessary The word 'analysis' emphasizes the need to reduce a complex problem to its component parts for better understanding. Systems analysis takes a complex problem and sorts out the tangle of significant factors so that each can be studied by the method most appropriate to it." Enthoven and Smith explained that they used mainly civilians as systems analysts because of "the independent point of view they can bring to the force planning process." McNamara's tendency to take military advice into account less than had previous secretaries contributed to his unpopularity with service leaders.

The most notable example of systems analysis was the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) instituted by DoD Comptroller Charles J. Hitch. McNamara directed Hitch to analyze defense requirements systematically and produce a long-term, program-oriented defense budget. PPBS evolved to become the heart of the McNamara management program. According to Enthoven and Smith, the basic ideas of PPBS were: "the attempt to put defense program issues into a broader context and to search for explicit measures of national need and adequacy"; "consideration of military needs and costs together"; "explicit consideration of alternatives at the top decision level"; "the active use of an analytical staff at the top policy-making levels"; "a plan combining both forces and costs which projected into the future the foreseeable implications of current decisions"; and "open and explicit analysis; that is, each analysis should be made available to all interested parties, so that they can examine the calculations, data, and assumptions and retrace the steps leading to the conclusions."

Among the management tools developed to implement PPBS were the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), the Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM), the Readiness, Information and Control Tables, and the Development Concept Paper

(DCP). The annual FYDP was a series of tables projecting forces for eight years and costs and manpower for five years, in mission-oriented, rather than individual service, programs. By 1968, the FYDP covered 10 military areas: strategic forces, general purpose forces, intelligence and communications, airlift and sealift, guard and reserve forces, research and development, central supply and maintenance, training and medical services, administration and related activities, and support of other nations.

The DPM, intended for the White House and usually prepared by the systems analysis office, was a method to study and analyze major defense issues. Sixteen DPMs appeared between 1961 and 1968, on such topics as strategic offensive and defensive forces, NATO strategy and force structure, military assistance, and tactical air forces. OSD sent the DPMs to the services and the JCS for comment; in making decisions, McNamara had in the DPM a statement of alternative approaches, force levels, and other factors. The DPM in its final form became a decision document.

The Development Concept Paper examined performance, schedule, cost estimates, and technical risks to provide a basis for determining whether to begin or continue a research and development program. The Readiness, Information and Control Tables provided data on specific projects, more detailed than in the FYDP, such as the tables for the Southeast Asia Deployment Plan, which recorded by month and quarter the schedule for deployment, consumption rates, and future projections of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.

PPBS was suspect in some quarters, especially among the military, because it was civilian-controlled and seemed to rely heavily on impersonal quantitative analysis. As Enthoven and Smith observed, "Much of the controversy over PPBS, particularly the use of systems analysis, is really an attack on the increased use of the legal authority of the Secretary of Defense and an expression of a view about his proper role." In spite of the criticism, the system persisted in modified form long after McNamara had left the Pentagon.

McNamara relied heavily on systems analysis to reach several controversial weapon decisions. He canceled the B-70 bomber, begun during the Eisenhower years as a replacement for the B-52, stating that it was neither cost-effective nor needed, and later he vetoed its proposed successor, the RS-70. McNamara expressed publicly his belief that there was no long-run future for the manned bomber as a strategic weapon; the intercontinental ballistic missile was faster, less vulnerable, and less

costly.

Similarly, McNamara terminated the SKYBOLT project late in 1962. Begun in 1959, SKYBOLT was a ballistic missile with a 1,000-nautical mile range, designed for launching from B-52 bombers as a defense suppression system to clear the way for bombers to penetrate to targets. McNamara decided that SKYBOLT was too expensive, not accurate enough, and would exceed its planned development time. He asserted that other systems, including the HOUND DOG missile, could do the job at less cost. Toward the end of his term McNamara also opposed an antiballistic missile (ABM) system proposed for installation in the United States, arguing that it would be too expensive (at least \$40 billion) and ultimately ineffective, for "the Soviets would clearly be strongly motivated to so increase their offensive capability as to cancel out our defensive advantage." Under pressure to proceed with the ABM program after it became clear that the Soviets had begun a similar project, McNamara finally agreed to a "thin" system, but he never believed that it was wise for the United States to move in that direction.

One weapon system that McNamara initiated and continued despite serious problems was the TFX (later F-111) aircraft. He believed that Navy and Air Force requirements for a new tactical fighter could best be met by development of a common aircraft. After extensive study of the recommendations of a joint Air Force-Navy evaluation board, McNamara awarded the TFX contract to General Dynamics. The decision, based on cost-effectiveness and efficiency considerations, irritated the chief of naval operations and the air force chief of staff, both of whom preferred separate new fighters for their services and Boeing as the contractor. Because of high cost overruns, trouble in meeting performance objectives, flight test crashes, and difficulties in adapting the plane to Navy use, the TFX's future became more and more uncertain. The Navy dropped its version in 1968. Some of McNamara's critics in the services and Congress labeled the TFX a failure, but versions of the F-111 remained in Air Force service two decades after McNamara decided to produce them.

McNamara's staff stressed systems analysis as an aid in decisionmaking on weapon development and many other budget issues. The secretary believed that the United States could afford any amount needed for national security, but that "this ability does not excuse us from applying strict standards of effectiveness and efficiency to the way we spend our defense dollars You have to make a judgment on how much is enough." Ac-

ting on these principles, McNamara instituted a much-publicized cost reduction program which he reported saved \$14 billion in the five-year period beginning in 1961. Although he had to withstand a storm of criticism from senators and representatives from affected congressional districts, he closed many military bases and installations that he judged unnecessary to national security. He was equally determined about other cost-saving measures.

Nonetheless, mainly because of the Vietnam War buildup, total obligatory authority increased greatly during the McNamara years. Fiscal year TOA increased from \$48.4 billion in 1962 to \$49.5 billion in 1965 (before the major Vietnam increases) to \$74.9 billion in 1968, McNamara's last year in office. Not until FY 1983 did DoD's total obligatory authority surpass that of FY 1968 in constant dollars.

In the broad arena of national security affairs, McNamara played a central role under both Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, especially during international crises. The first of these was the April 1961 attempt by a Cuban exile group, with some support from the United States, to unseat Prime Minister Fidel Castro. The disastrous failure of the "Bay of Pigs" invasion, carried through by the Kennedy administration based on planning begun under Eisenhower, proved a great embarrassment. When McNamara left office in 1968, he told reporters that his principal regret was his recommendation to Kennedy to proceed with the Bay of Pigs operation, something that "could have been recognized as an error at the time."

More successful from McNamara's point of view was his participation in the Executive Committee, a small group of advisers who counseled Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. McNamara supported the president's decision to quarantine Cuba to prevent Soviet ships from bringing in more offensive weapons. During the crisis the Pentagon placed U.S. military forces on alert, ready to back up the administration's demand that the Soviet Union withdraw its offensive missiles from Cuba. McNamara believed that the outcome of the missile crisis "demonstrated the readiness of our armed forces to meet a sudden emergency" and "highlighted the importance of maintaining a properly balanced Defense establishment." Similarly, McNamara regarded the use of nearly 24,000 U.S. troops and several dozen naval vessels to stabilize a revolutionary situation in the Dominican Republic in April 1965 as another successful test of the "readiness and capabilities of

the U.S. defense establishment to support our foreign policy."

The Vietnam conflict came to claim most of McNamara's time and energy. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations had committed the United States to support the French and native anticommunist forces in Vietnam in resisting efforts by the communists in the north to control the country. The U.S. role, including financial support and military advice, expanded after 1954 when the French withdrew. During the Kennedy administration, the U.S. military advisory group in South Vietnam steadily increased, with Secretary McNamara's concurrence, from just a few hundred to about 17,000. U.S. involvement escalated, especially after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 when North Vietnamese naval vessels reportedly fired on two U.S. destroyers. President Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes on North Vietnamese naval bases and Congress approved almost unanimously the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing the president "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression."

In 1965, in response to stepped up military activity by the communist Viet Cong in South Vietnam and their North Vietnamese allies, the United States began bombing North Vietnam, deployed large military forces, and entered into combat in South Vietnam. Requests from top U.S. military commanders in Vietnam led to the commitment of 485,000 troops by the end of 1967 and almost 535,000 by 30 June 1968. The casualty lists mounted as the number of troops and the intensity of fighting escalated.

Although he loyally supported administration policy, McNamara gradually became skeptical about whether the war could be won by deploying more troops to South Vietnam and intensifying the bombing of North Vietnam. He traveled to Vietnam many times to study the situation firsthand. He became increasingly reluctant to approve the large force increments requested by the military commanders. The Tet offensive of early 1968, although a military defeat for the enemy, clearly indicated that the road ahead for both the United States and the South Vietnamese government was still long and hard. By this time McNamara had already submitted his resignation, probably because of his disillusionment with the war, and was near the end of his tour as secretary of defense.

As McNamara grew more and more controversial after 1966 and his differences with the presi-

dent and the JCS over Vietnam policy became the subject of public speculation, frequent rumors surfaced that he would leave office. Yet there was great surprise when President Johnson announced on 29 November 1967 that McNamara would resign to become president of the World Bank. The increasing intensity of the antiwar movement in the United States and the approaching presidential campaign, in which Johnson was expected to seek reelection, figured heavily in explanations of McNamara's departure. So also did McNamara's alleged differences with the JCS over the bombing of North Vietnam, the number of U.S. troops to be assigned to the ground war, and construction along the 17th parallel separating South and North Vietnam of an anti-infiltration ground barrier, which McNamara favored and the JCS opposed. McNamara's resistance to deployment of a major ABM system also upset the military chiefs. The president's announcement of McNamara's move to the World Bank stressed his stated interest in the job and that he deserved a change after seven years as secretary of defense, much longer than any of his predecessors.

McNamara left office on 29 February 1968; for his dedicated efforts, the president awarded him both the Medal of Freedom and the Distinguished Service Medal. He served as head of the World Bank from 1968 to 1981. Shortly after he departed the Pentagon, he published *The Essence of Security*, discussing various aspects of his tenure and his position on basic national security issues. He did not speak out again on defense issues until after he left the World Bank. In 1982 McNamara joined several other former national security officials in urging that the United States pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in Europe in the event of hostilities; subsequently he proposed the elimination of nuclear weapons as an element of NATO's defense posture.

Evaluations of McNamara's long career as secretary of defense vary from glowing to negative and sometimes scathing. One journalist reported criticism of McNamara as a "'human IBM machine' who cares more for computerized statistical logic than for human judgments." On the other hand, a congressman who had helped shape the National Security Act in 1947 stated when McNamara left the Pentagon that he "has come nearer [than anyone else] to being exactly what we planned a Secretary of Defense to be when we first wrote the Unification Act." Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote, "Except for General Marshall I do not know of any department head who, during the half century I have

observed government in Washington, has so profoundly enhanced the position, power and security of the United States as Mr. McNamara." Reporter Hanson W. Baldwin cited an impressive list of McNamara accomplishments: containment of the more damaging aspects of service rivalry; significant curtailment of duplication and waste in weapon development; institution of systems analysis and the PPBS; application of computer


technology; elimination of obsolescent military posts and facilities; and introduction of a flexible strategy, which among other things improved U.S. capacity to wage conventional and limited wars. Although McNamara had many differences with military leaders and members of Congress, few could deny that he had had a powerful impact on the defense establishment, and that much of what he had done would be a lasting legacy.

Clark M. Clifford (1968-1969)

On 19 January 1968 President Johnson announced his selection of Clark M. Clifford as McNamara's successor. Clifford was born in Fort Scott, Kansas, on 25 December 1906, took both a bachelor's and law degree (1928) at Washington University, and practiced law in St. Louis between 1928 and 1943. He served as an officer with the Navy from 1944 to 1946, including assignment as assistant naval aide and naval aide to the president. After separation from the Navy, he held the position of special counsel to the president from 1946 to 1950. During this period he participated extensively in the legislative efforts resulting in the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendments.

After leaving the government in 1950 Clifford practiced law in Washington, but continued to advise the White House occasionally. In 1960 he was a member of President-elect Kennedy's Committee on the Defense Establishment, headed by Stuart Symington. In May 1961 Kennedy appointed him to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which he chaired beginning in April 1963. After President Johnson entered office, Clifford served frequently as an unofficial counselor and sometimes undertook short-term official duties, including a trip with General Maxwell Taylor in 1967 to Vietnam and other Southeast Asian and Pacific countries. Clifford estimated that in the year prior to his appointment as secretary of defense he had spent about half of his time advising the president and the other half with his law firm.

Widely known and respected in Washington and knowledgeable on defense issues when he became secretary of defense on 1 March 1968, Clifford was generally hailed as a worthy successor to McNamara. Many regarded the new secretary as



more of a hawk on Vietnam than McNamara and thought his selection might presage an escalation of the U.S. military effort there. Clifford attempted to allay such fears when, responding to a query on whether he was a hawk or dove, he remarked, "I am not conscious of falling under any of those ornithological divisions."

In any case, Vietnam remained Clifford's main concern during his less than 11 months in office. He did not change the management system

McNamara installed at the Pentagon, and for the most part assigned internal administration to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H. Nitze. Clifford made no effort to depart from McNamara's policies and programs on such matters as nuclear strategy, NATO, and military assistance, but he favored the SENTINEL ABM system which McNamara had accorded only lukewarm support. He wanted to deploy the system and supported congressional appropriations for it. One important effect of SENTINEL construction, he thought, would be to encourage the Soviet Union to enter arms control talks with the United States. Indeed, before Clifford left office, the Johnson administration made arrangements for negotiations which eventually led to the ABM limitation treaty in 1972.

Clifford continued McNamara's highly publicized Cost Reduction Program, announcing that over \$1.2 billion had been saved in FY 1968 as a result of the effort. Faced with a congressionally mandated reduction of expenditures in FY 1969, Clifford suspended the planned activation of an infantry division and deactivated 50 small ships, 9 naval air squadrons, and 23 NIKE-HERCULES launch sites.

By the time Clifford became secretary, DoD work on the FY 1969 budget was complete. It amounted in total obligational authority to \$77.7 billion, almost \$3 billion more than in FY 1968. The final FY 1970 budget, which Clifford and his staff worked on before they left office, amounted to \$75.5 billion TOA.

Clifford took office committed to continuing the president's Vietnam policies. At his nomination hearing, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee that "our limited objective is to assure to the South Vietnamese people the right of self-determination." He opposed ending the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam but acknowledged that the situation could change. In fact, on 31 March 1968, just a month after Clifford arrived at the Pentagon, President Johnson, in an effort to get peace talks started, ordered the cessation of bombing north of the 20th parallel, an area comprising almost 80 percent of North Vietnam's land area and 90 percent of its population. In the same address, Johnson announced that he would not be a candidate for reelection in 1968. Soon the North Vietnamese agreed to negotiations, which began in Paris in mid-May 1968. Later, on 31 October 1968, to encourage the successful outcome of these talks, the president, with Clifford's strong support, ordered an end to all bombing in North Vietnam.

Clifford, like McNamara, had to deal with fre-

quent requests for additional troops from military commanders in Vietnam. When he became secretary, the authorized force in Vietnam was 525,000. At the end of March 1968 the president agreed to send 24,500 more troops on an emergency basis, raising authorized strength to 549,500, a figure never reached. Even as he oversaw a continued buildup, Clifford preferred to emphasize the points President Johnson had made in his 31 March address: that the South Vietnamese army could take over a greater share of the fighting, that the administration would place an absolute limit on the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam, and that it would take steps, including the bombing restrictions, to reduce the combat level.

Eventually Clifford moved very close, with the president's tacit support, to the position McNamara held on Vietnam just before he left office: no further increases in U.S. troop levels, support for the bombing halt, and gradual disengagement from the conflict. By this time Clifford clearly disagreed with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who believed, according to the *Washington Post*, "that the war was being won by the allies" and that it "would be won if America had the will to win it." After he left office, Clifford, in the July 1969 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, made his views crystal clear: "Nothing we might do could be so beneficial . . . as to begin to withdraw our combat troops. Moreover . . . we cannot realistically expect to achieve anything more through our military force, and the time has come to begin to disengage. That was my final conclusion as I left the Pentagon on January 20, 1969."

Although the Johnson administration ended under the cloud of the Vietnam War, Clifford concluded his short term as secretary of defense with his reputation probably enhanced. He got along well with Congress and this helped him to secure approval of at least some of his program. Besides settling in to his duties quickly and efficiently, Clifford capably managed the initial deescalation of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict; indeed, he apparently strongly influenced the president in favor of the deescalation strategy. As he left office to return to his law practice in Washington, Clifford expressed the hope and expectation that international tension would abate, citing the shift in the Vietnam confrontation from the battlefield to the conference table and the evident willingness of the Soviet Union to discuss limitations on strategic nuclear weapons.

Melvin R. Laird (1969-1973)

In December 1968 President-elect Richard M. Nixon announced his intention to nominate Melvin R. Laird to be secretary of defense. Laird was born in Omaha, Nebraska, on 1 September 1922. In 1942 he graduated from Carleton College in Minnesota, then entered the United States Navy as an enlisted man. He received an ensign's commission in April 1944 and served on a destroyer in the Pacific. The recipient of the Purple Heart and several other decorations, Laird left the Navy in April 1946.

About the same time, at age 23, Laird entered the Wisconsin State Senate, succeeding his recently deceased father. He remained there until his election in November 1952 to the United States House of Representatives. Subsequently reelected eight consecutive times, he was chairman of the House Republican Conference when Nixon selected him for the cabinet. A very active congressman, Laird was known for his work on both domestic and defense issues, including his service on the defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. Laird left Congress reluctantly, making it clear when he became secretary on 22 January 1969 that he intended to serve no more than four years.

As a congressman Laird had supported a strong defense posture and had sometimes been critical of Secretary McNamara. In September 1966, characterizing himself as a member of the "loyal opposition," he publicly charged the Johnson administration with "deception" about Vietnam war costs and for delaying decisions to escalate the ground war until after the 1966 congressional elections. Laird also criticized McNamara's management and decisionmaking practices. After he became secretary of defense, Laird and President Nixon appointed a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel which made more than 100 recommendations on DoD's organization and functions in a lengthy report of 1 July 1970. The department implemented many of the panel's proposals while Laird served in the Pentagon.

Laird did not depart abruptly from the McNamara-Clifford management system, but rather instituted gradual changes. He pursued what he called "participatory management," an approach calculated to gain the cooperation of the military leadership in reducing the defense budget and the size of the military establishment. While retaining decisionmaking functions for himself and the deputy secretary of defense, Laird somewhat decentralized policymaking and operations. He accorded the service secretaries and the JCS a more influential role in development of budgets and



force levels. He revised the PPBS, including a return to the use of service budget ceilings and service programming of forces within these ceilings. The previously powerful systems analysis office could no longer initiate planning, only evaluate and review service proposals.

As Laird noted in his FY 1971 report, "Except for the major policy decisions, I am striving to decentralize decision-making as much as possible So, we are placing primary responsibility for detailed force planning on the Joint Chiefs and the Services, and we are delegating to the Military Departments more responsibility to manage development and procurement programs." The military leadership was enthusiastic about Laird's methods. As the *Washington Post* reported after his selection as secretary of defense, "Around the military-industrial complex these days they're singing 'Praise the Laird and pass the transformation.'"

Laird did not shrink from centralized management where he found it useful or warranted. His tenure saw the establishment of the Defense Investigative Service, the Defense Mapping Agency, the Office of Net Assessment, and the Defense Security Assistance Agency (to administer all DoD

military assistance programs). In October 1972 Congress passed legislation creating a second deputy secretary of defense position, a proposal Laird strongly supported, even though he never filled the position. Laird paid special attention to two important interdepartmental bodies: the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), composed of senior Defense, State, and CIA officials, which gathered information necessary for presidential decisions on the crisis use of U.S. military forces; and the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC), which brought together representatives from many agencies, including DoD, State, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Office of Management and Budget, to analyze defense budget issues as a basis for advising the president, placing, as Laird commented, "national security needs in proper relationship to non-defense requirements."

Laird succeeded in improving DoD's standing with Congress. As a highly respected congressional veteran, Laird had a head start in his efforts to gain more legislative support for Defense programs. He maintained close contact with old congressional friends, and he spent many hours testifying before Senate and House committees. Recognizing the congressional determination, with wide public support, to cut defense costs (including winding down the Vietnam War), Laird worked hard to prune budgetary requests before they went to Congress, and acceded to additional cuts when they could be absorbed without serious harm to national security. One approach, which made it possible to proceed with new strategic weapon systems like the B-1 bomber, the TRIDENT nuclear submarine, and cruise missiles, was agreement to a substantial cut in conventional forces. As a result, total military personnel declined from some 3.5 million in FY 1968 to 2.25 million by the end of FY 1973, Laird's last year in office.

Other initiatives, including troop withdrawals from Vietnam, phasing out old weapon systems, base closures, and improved procurement practices, enabled the Pentagon to hold the line on spending, even at a time when high inflation affected both weapon and personnel costs. In Laird's years, total obligatory authority by fiscal year was as follows: 1969, \$77.7 billion; 1970, \$75.5 billion; 1971, \$72.8 billion; 1972, \$76.5 billion; and 1973, \$78.9 billion.

Vietnam preoccupied Laird as it had McNamara and Clifford. In 1968 Nixon campaigned on a platform critical of the Johnson administration's handling of the war and promised to achieve "peace with honor." Although not receptive to

demands for immediate withdrawal, Laird acknowledged the necessity to disengage U.S. combat forces gradually. Thus he developed and strongly supported "Vietnamization," a program intended to expand, equip, and train South Vietnam's forces and assign to them an ever-increasing combat role, at the same time steadily reducing the number of U.S. combat troops. During 1969, the new administration cut authorized U.S. troop strength in Vietnam from 549,500 to 484,000, and by 1 May 1972 the number stood at 69,000. During this same period, from January 1969 to May 1972, U.S. combat deaths declined 95 percent from the 1968 peak, and war expenditures fell by about two-thirds. Laird publicized Vietnamization widely; in his final report as secretary of defense in early 1973, he stated: "Vietnamization . . . today is virtually completed. As a consequence of the success of the military aspects of Vietnamization, the South Vietnamese people today, in my view, are fully capable of providing for their own in-country security against the North Vietnamese."

In this same report Laird noted that the war had commanded more of his attention than any other concern during his four-year term. Upon becoming secretary he set up a special advisory group of DoD officials, known as the Vietnam Task Force, and he met with them almost every morning he was in the Pentagon. He also visited Vietnam several times for on-the-scene evaluations. Although his program of Vietnamization could be termed a success, if one considers the progress of troop withdrawals, U.S. involvement in the conflict became perhaps even more disruptive at home during Nixon's presidency than during Johnson's. The U.S. incursion into Cambodia in May 1970 to eliminate North Vietnamese sanctuaries, the renewed bombing of North Vietnam and the mining of its harbors in the spring of 1972 in response to a North Vietnamese offensive, and another bombing campaign against the north in December 1972 brought widespread protest. Nixon's Vietnam policy, as well as that of previous administrations, suffered further criticism when, in June 1971, the so-called "Pentagon Papers," a highly classified narrative and documentary history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967, prepared at Secretary McNamara's order, was leaked and published in part in several major newspapers.

While publicly supporting Nixon's Vietnam course, Laird privately opposed the Cambodian invasion and the 1972 spring bombing and mining operations. He counted on the success of Vietnamization, public peace talks which had begun in 1968 in Paris, and the secret negotiations between

Henry Kissinger, the president's assistant for national security affairs, and North Vietnamese representatives, to end the conflict. On 27 January 1973, two days before Laird left office, the negotiators signed a Vietnam settlement in Paris. They agreed to an in-place ceasefire to begin on 28 January 1973, complete withdrawal of U.S. forces within 60 days, concurrent phased release of U.S. prisoners of war in North Vietnam, and establishment of an international control commission to handle disagreements among the signatories. Although, as time was to demonstrate, South Vietnam was not really capable of defending its independence, Laird retired from office satisfied that he had accomplished his major objective, the disengagement of United States combat forces from Vietnam.

Vietnam preoccupied Laird, but not to the exclusion of other pressing matters. Although not intimately involved in the development of strategic nuclear policy as McNamara had been, Laird subscribed to the Nixon administration's program of "Strategic Sufficiency"—that the United States should have the nuclear capability to deter nuclear attacks against its home territory and its allies by convincing a potential aggressor that he would suffer an unacceptable level of retaliatory damage; it should also have enough nuclear forces to eliminate possible coercion of its allies. The policy, not much different from McNamara's except in name and phrasing, embraced the need both to avoid mass destruction of civilians and to seek mechanisms to prevent escalation of a nuclear conflict. The administration further refined its strategic ideas in July 1969 when the president issued a statement that came to be known as the "Nixon Doctrine," stressing "pursuit of peace through partnership with our allies." Instead of the previous administration's "2 1/2 war" concept—readiness to fight simultaneous wars on two major fronts and one minor front—the Nixon Doctrine cut back to the "1 1/2 war" level. Through military aid and credit-assisted sales of military equipment abroad, the United States would prepare its allies to take up a greater share of the defense burden, especially manpower needs, in case of war. U.S. military forces would be "smaller, more mobile, and more efficient general purpose forces that . . . [would] neither cast the United States in the role of world policeman nor force the nation into a new isolationism."

Laird supported the strategic arms talks leading to the SALT I agreements with the Soviet Union in 1972: a five-year moratorium against expansion of strategic nuclear delivery systems, and an an-

tiballistic missile treaty limiting each side to two sites (later cut to one) for deployed ABM systems. As Laird put it, "In terms of United States strategic objectives, SALT I improved our deterrent posture, braked the rapid build-up of Soviet strategic forces, and permitted us to continue those programs which are essential to maintaining the sufficiency of our long-term strategic nuclear deterrent."

Other important Laird goals were a zero-level draft by 30 June 1973 and the creation of an All Volunteer Force (AVF). In large part, opposition to selective service derived from the Vietnam War. Draft calls declined progressively during Laird's years at the Pentagon—from 300,000 in his first year, to 200,000 in the second, 100,000 in the third, and 50,000 in the fourth. On 27 January 1973, after the signing of the Vietnam agreement in Paris, Laird suspended the draft, five months ahead of schedule.

Laird completed his term of office as secretary of defense on 29 January 1973. Because he had stated repeatedly that he would serve only four years (only Wilson and McNamara among his predecessors served longer), it came as no surprise when President Nixon on 28 November 1972 nominated Elliot L. Richardson to succeed him. In his final report in January 1973 Laird listed what he considered to be the major accomplishments of his tenure: Vietnamization; achieving the goal of strategic sufficiency; "effective burden sharing" between the United States and its friends and allies; adequate security assistance; maintenance of U.S. technological superiority through development of systems such as the B-1, TRIDENT, and cruise missiles; improved procurement; "People Programs" such as ending the draft and creating the AVF; improved National Guard and Reserve forces; enhanced operational readiness; and participatory management.

In spite of the Vietnam quagmire and the unfolding Watergate affair, which threatened to discredit the entire Nixon administration, Laird retired with his reputation intact. Although not a close confidant of the president and not the dominant presence that McNamara was, Laird had been an influential secretary. He cultivated a smooth association with the military leadership by restoring some of the responsibilities they had lost during the 1960s. His excellent relations with Congress enabled him to gain approval for many of his programs and budget requests.

After a brief absence Laird returned to the Nixon administration in June 1973 as counselor to the president for domestic affairs, concerning

himself mainly with legislative issues. In February 1974, as the Watergate crisis in the White House deepened, Laird resigned to become senior counselor for national and international affairs for *Reader's Digest*. Since 1974 he has written widely, in the *Reader's Digest* and other publications, on national and international topics.

Elliot L. Richardson (January–May 1973)

Laird's successor, Elliot L. Richardson, sworn into office on 30 January 1973, served less than four months and thus had limited impact on the affairs of the department. Born in Boston on 20 July 1920, Richardson graduated from Harvard College in 1941 and from the Harvard Law School in 1947. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1942 as a private, subsequently received a commission, and left the service as a first lieutenant in 1945, after participating in the D-Day invasion of Normandy and receiving several decorations, including the Purple Heart.

Richardson served as a law clerk to Justice Learned Hand of the U.S. Court of Appeals and then to Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1949 he joined a Boston law firm, with which he was associated between service in several appointive and elective positions: assistant to Sen. Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts (1953-54); assistant secretary of health, education, and welfare for legislation (1957-59); U.S. attorney for Massachusetts (1959-61); special assistant to the U.S. attorney general (1961); lieutenant governor (1965-67) and attorney general (1967-69) of Massachusetts; under secretary of state (1969-70); and secretary of health, education, and welfare (1970-73).

When President Nixon selected Richardson as secretary of defense, the press described him as an excellent manager and administrator, perhaps the best in the cabinet. In his confirmation hearing, Richardson expressed agreement with Nixon's policies on such issues as the adequacy of U.S. strategic forces, NATO and relationships with other allies, and Vietnam. Although he promised to examine the defense budget carefully to identify areas for savings, and in fact later ordered the closing of some military installations, he cautioned against precipitate cuts. As he told a Senate committee, "Significant cuts in the Defense Budget



now would seriously weaken the U.S. position in international negotiations—in which U.S. military capabilities, in both real and symbolic terms, are an important factor." Similarly, he strongly supported continued military assistance at current levels. During his short tenure, Richardson spent much time testifying before congressional committees on the proposed FY 1974 budget and other defense matters.

On 30 April 1973 President Nixon announced that he would nominate Secretary Richardson to be attorney general. It was understood that Richardson would guide the administration's

handling of the Watergate investigation, which had reached a critical stage. Richardson continued to serve as secretary of defense until 24 May 1973, the day before he became attorney general. His tenure in that position was short also; he resigned abruptly in October 1973 after declining to support the president's decision to fire a Watergate special prosecutor Richardson had appointed. Subsequent-

ly, Richardson served President Gerald Ford as ambassador to Great Britain and secretary of commerce, and President Jimmy Carter as ambassador at large and special representative for the Law of the Sea Conference (1977-80). Thereafter, he remained publicly active, speaking and writing widely on national security and other issues.


James R. Schlesinger (1973-1975)

To replace Richardson, President Nixon chose James R. Schlesinger, who was born on 15 February 1929 in New York City and educated at Harvard University, where he earned a B.A. (1950), M.A. (1952), and Ph.D. (1956) in economics. Between 1955 and 1963 he taught economics at the University of Virginia and in 1960 published *The Political Economy of National Security*. In 1963 he moved to the Rand Corporation, where he worked until 1969, in the later years as director of strategic studies.

In 1969 Schlesinger joined the Nixon administration as assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget, where he spent much time on defense matters. In 1971, President Nixon appointed Schlesinger a member of the Atomic Energy Commission and designated him as chairman. Serving in this position for about a year and a half, Schlesinger instituted extensive organizational and management changes in an effort to improve the AEC's regulatory performance. In February 1973 he became director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Although his CIA service was short, he again undertook comprehensive organizational and personnel changes. By this time he had a reputation as a tough, forthright, and outspoken administrator.

Nominated by Nixon on 10 May 1973, Schlesinger became secretary of defense on 2 July at age 44. Despite his relative youth, given his academic and government credentials he appeared exceptionally well-qualified for the post. As a university professor, researcher at Rand, and government official in three agencies, he had acquired an impressive background in national security affairs.

Shortly after assuming office, Schlesinger outlined the basic objectives that would guide his administration: maintain a "strong defense



establishment"; "assure the military balance so necessary to deterrence and a more enduring peace"; obtain for members of the military "the respect, dignity and support that are their due"; assume "an . . . obligation to use our citizens' resources wisely"; and "become increasingly competitive with potential adversaries . . . We must not be forced out of the market—on land, at sea, or in the air. Eli Whitney belongs to us, not to our competitors." In particular, Schlesinger saw a need in the post-Vietnam era to restore the morale and prestige of the military services; modernize

strategic doctrine and programs; step up research and development; and shore up a defense budget that had been declining since 1968.

In the strategic arena, Schlesinger maintained that the theory and practice of the 1950s and 1960s had been overtaken by events, particularly the rise of the Soviet Union to virtual nuclear parity with the United States and the effect this development had on the concept of deterrence. Schlesinger believed that "deterrence is not a substitute for defense; defense capabilities, representing the potential for effective counteraction, are the essential condition of deterrence." He had grave doubts about the assured destruction strategy, which relied on massive nuclear attacks against an enemy's urban-industrial areas. Credible strategic nuclear deterrence, the secretary felt, depended on several conditions: maintaining essential equivalence with the Soviet Union in force effectiveness; maintaining a highly survivable force that could be withheld or targeted against an enemy's economic base in order to deter "coercive or desperation" attacks against U.S. population or economic targets; establishing a fast-response force that could act to deter additional enemy attacks; and establishing a range of capabilities sufficient to convince all nations that the United States was equal to its strongest competitors.

To meet these needs, Schlesinger built on existing ideas in developing a flexible response nuclear strategy which, with the president's approval, he made public by early 1974. The United States, Schlesinger said, needed the ability, in the event of a nuclear attack, to respond so as to "limit the chances of uncontrolled escalation" and "hit meaningful targets" without causing widespread collateral damage. The nation's assured destruction force would be withheld in the hope that the enemy would not attack U.S. cities. In rejecting assured destruction, Schlesinger quoted President Nixon: "Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?"

With this approach Schlesinger moved to a partial counterforce policy, emphasizing Soviet military targets such as ICBM missile installations, avoiding initial attacks on population centers, and minimizing unintended collateral damage. He explicitly disavowed any intention to acquire a destabilizing first-strike capability against the USSR. But he wanted "an offensive capability of such size and composition that all will perceive it as in overall balance with the strategic forces of

any potential opponent."

Because he regarded conventional forces as an equally essential element in the deterrence posture of the United States, Schlesinger wanted to reverse what he perceived as a gradual downward trend in conventional force strength. As he pointed out, "With the rise of Soviet nuclear power, which has brought about an approximate parity in U.S.-Soviet nuclear capabilities, the relative contribution to deterrence made by our own strategic forces has inevitably declined." One of the functions of conventional forces, he noted, was "to deter or to repel limited threats by limited means."

In this vein, Schlesinger devoted much attention to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, citing the need to strengthen its conventional capabilities. He rejected the old assumption that NATO did not need a direct counter to Warsaw Pact conventional forces because it could rely on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, noting that the approximate nuclear parity between the United States and the Russians in the 1970s made this stand inappropriate. While the U.S. nuclear guarantee to its allies stood, Schlesinger explained that "our nuclear forces no longer carry the same dominant weight in the balance of deterrence . . . and this places a higher value on NATO's conventional military capabilities." He also rejected the argument that NATO could not afford a conventional counterweight to Warsaw Pact forces. In his discussions with NATO leaders, Schlesinger promoted the concept of burden-sharing, stressing the troubles that the United States faced in the mid-1970s because of an unfavorable balance of international payments. He urged qualitative improvements in NATO forces, including equipment standardization, and an increase in defense spending by NATO governments of up to 5 percent of their gross national product.

Schlesinger had an abiding interest in strategic theory, but he also had to deal with a succession of immediate crises that tested his administrative and political skills. In October 1973, three months after he took office, Egypt and Syria launched the Yom Kippur War with a sudden attack on Israel. A few days after the war started, with Israel not faring well militarily and the Soviets resupplying the Arab belligerents, the United States began airlifting supplies to Israel. As Schlesinger explained, the initial U.S. policy to avoid direct involvement rested on the assumption that Israel would win quickly. But when it became clear that the Israelis faced formidable military forces and could not make their own resupply arrangements, the United States took up the burden. Schlesinger rejected charges

that the Defense Department delayed the resupply effort to avoid irritating the Arab states and that he had had a serious disagreement over this matter with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Eventually the combatants agreed to a cease-fire, but not before the Soviet Union threatened to intervene on the Arab side and the United States declared a worldwide alert of its forces. In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur conflict, partly because of U.S. assistance to the Israelis, the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut off oil shipments to the United States for several months.

Another crisis flared in July 1974 when Turkish forces, concerned about the safety of the Turkish minority community, invaded Cyprus after the Cypriot National Guard, supported by the government of Greece, overthrew the president, Archbishop Makarios. When the fighting stopped, the Turks held the northern section of the island, about 40 percent of the total area. Turkey's military action caused controversy in the United States, because of protests by Greek Cypriot supporters and because Turkish forces used some U.S.-supplied military equipment intended solely for NATO purposes. Schlesinger indicated that he felt the Turks had overstepped the bounds of legitimate interests in Cyprus and suggested that the United States might have to reexamine its military aid program to Turkey. During this time President Nixon was forced to resign and was succeeded by Gerald R. Ford; eventually Ford and Secretary Kissinger made it clear that they favored continued military assistance to Turkey as a valued NATO ally, but Congress in December 1974 prohibited such aid, instituting an embargo which lasted five years.

The last phase of the Indochina conflict occurred during Schlesinger's term. Although all U.S. combat forces had left South Vietnam in the spring of 1973, the United States continued to maintain a military presence in other areas of Southeast Asia. Some senators criticized Schlesinger and questioned him sharply during his confirmation hearings in June 1973 after he stated that he would recommend resumption of U.S. bombing in North Vietnam and Laos if North Vietnam launched a major offensive against South Vietnam. However, when the North Vietnamese did begin an offensive early in 1975, the United States could do little to help the South Vietnamese, who collapsed completely as the North Vietnamese entered Saigon in late April. Schlesinger announced early in the morning of 29 April 1975 that the last U.S. diplomatic, military,

and civilian personnel were being evacuated from Saigon by helicopter.

Only one other notable event remained in the Indochina drama. In May 1975 forces of the communist Cambodian government boarded and captured the crew of the *Mayaguez*, an unarmed U.S.-registered freighter. The United States bombarded military and fuel installations on the Cambodian mainland and launched an amphibious invasion of an offshore island to rescue the crew. The 39 captives were retrieved, but the attack cost the lives of 41 U.S. military personnel. Nevertheless, the majority of the American people seemed to approve the administration's decisive action.

Unsurprisingly, given his determination to build up U.S. strategic and conventional forces, Schlesinger devoted much time and effort to the defense budget. Even before becoming secretary, in a speech in San Francisco in September 1972, he warned that it was time "to call a halt to the self-defeating game of cutting defense outlays—this process, that seems to have become addicting, of chopping away year after year." Shortly after he took office, he complained about "the post-war follies" of defense budget-cutting. Later he outlined the facts about the defense budget: in real terms it had been reduced by one-third since FY 1968; it was one-eighth below the pre-Vietnam War FY 1964 budget; purchases of equipment, consumables, and R&D were down 45 percent from the wartime peak and about \$10 billion in constant dollars below the prewar level; defense now absorbed about 6 percent of the gross national product, the lowest percentage since before the Korean War; military manpower was at the lowest point since before the Korean War; and defense spending amounted to about 17 percent of total national expenditures, the lowest since before the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941.

Armed with these statistics, and alarmed by continuing Soviet weapon advances, Schlesinger became a vigorous advocate of larger defense budgets. He stated in his annual report early in 1975, in support of the administration's budget request and its related strategic concepts, that "in a world where the United States simply cannot escape great responsibilities, military power remains relevant." But he had little success: for FY 1975, Congress provided TOA of \$86.1 billion, compared with \$81.6 billion in FY 1974; for FY 1976, the amount was \$95.6 billion, in real terms only a little more than it had been in FY 1955. Likewise in real terms, there was virtually no change between FY 1974 and FY 1976.

Schlesinger's insistence on higher defense

budgets, his disagreements within the administration and with Congress on this issue, and his differences with Secretary of State Kissinger all contributed to his dismissal from office by President Ford in November 1975. Kissinger strongly supported the SALT process, while Schlesinger wanted assurances that arms control agreements would not put the United States in a strategic position inferior to the Soviet Union. The defense secretary's harsh criticism of some congressional leaders dismayed President Ford, who was more willing than Schlesinger to compromise on the defense budget. On 2 November 1975, the president dismissed Schlesinger and made other important personnel changes. Kissinger lost his position as special assistant to the president for national security affairs but remained as secretary of state. Schlesinger left office on 19 November 1975, explaining his departure in terms of his budgetary differences with the White House.

In spite of the controversy surrounding both his tenure and dismissal, Schlesinger was by most accounts an able secretary of defense. A serious and perceptive thinker on nuclear strategy, he was determined that the United States not fall seriously behind the Soviet Union in conventional and nuclear forces and devoted himself to modernization of defense policies and programs. He got

along well with the military leadership because he proposed to give them more resources, consulted with them regularly, and generally shared their views. Because he could be blunt in his opinions and did not enjoy the personal rapport with legislators that Laird had, his relations with Congress were often strained. A majority of its members may have approved Schlesinger's strategic plans, but they kept a tight rein on the money for his programs. As for the Pentagon bureaucracy, Schlesinger generally left its management to Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements.


After leaving the Pentagon, Schlesinger wrote and spoke forcefully about national security issues, especially the Soviet threat and the need for the United States to maintain adequate defenses. When Jimmy Carter became president in January 1977 he appointed Schlesinger, a Republican, as his special adviser on energy and subsequently as the first head of the new Department of Energy, which became operational in October 1977. Schlesinger served in this position until July 1979 when Carter replaced him along with several other cabinet members. Thereafter he resumed his writing and speaking career and served as a senior adviser to Lehman Brothers, Kuhn Loeb Inc., of New York City.

Donald H. Rumsfeld (1975-1977)

To replace Schlesinger, President Ford chose Donald H. Rumsfeld. Born on 9 July 1932 in Chicago, Rumsfeld graduated from Princeton University in 1954 and then spent three years in the U.S. Navy as an aviator and flight instructor. Following naval service Rumsfeld worked in Washington as an assistant to two different congressmen and then, between 1960 and 1962, at a Chicago investment banking firm. Elected to the House of Representatives in 1962, he was reelected in 1964, 1966, and 1968. In 1969 he resigned from Congress to join the Nixon administration as an assistant to the president and director of the Office of Economic Opportunity; later he served as counselor to the president and director of the Cost of Living Council. In February 1973 he became U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In August 1974 Rumsfeld headed Gerald Ford's transition team and then became

assistant to the president, directing the White House Office of Operations and serving as coordinator of the White House Staff. At the time of his designation as secretary of defense, Rumsfeld was one of President Ford's closest associates and advisers.

Sworn in on 20 November 1975, at age 43 the youngest secretary of defense to date, Rumsfeld served exactly 14 months in the office. Although he instituted some organizational changes at the Pentagon, including appointing a second deputy secretary of defense (a position created in 1972 but never previously filled) and consolidating several offices in OSD, Rumsfeld concentrated more on the political aspects of his job. More than any of his predecessors, he served as a roving ambassador for the Defense Department, traveling widely in the United States and abroad, discussing defense issues through numerous speeches, press con-



ferences, and interviews.

Although he supported the Ford administration's efforts at detente, Rumsfeld, like Schlesinger, sought to reverse the gradual decline in the defense budget and to build up U.S. strategic and conventional forces. Rumsfeld made clear that he agreed with Schlesinger's strategic and budget initiatives and that he would press forward with them. He pointed out in his FY 1977 annual report that "U.S. strategic forces retain a substantial credible capability to deter an all-out nuclear attack," but he indicated three areas of concern: (1) U.S. submarine and bomber forces were aging while Soviet capabilities in antisubmarine warfare and bomber defense were improving; (2) because of Soviet progress in offensive and defensive programs there was danger that Soviet strategic capability would be perceived as superior to that of the United States; and (3) "a continuation of current Soviet strategic programs . . . could threaten the survivability of the Minuteman force within a decade." Rumsfeld used the phrase "rough equivalence" to compare the current military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. He noted that trends in comparative U.S.-Soviet military strength had not favored the United States for 15 to 20 years, and that if continued they "would have the effect of injecting a

fundamental instability in the world."

To maintain strategic parity with the Soviet Union, Rumsfeld moved ahead with several proposed weapon systems—the B-1 manned bomber to replace the B-52, the TRIDENT nuclear submarine program, and the MX ICBM to succeed the MINUTEMAN in the 1980s. He personally piloted a test version of the B-1 bomber and authorized the Air Force to execute the initial contracts for its production. Rumsfeld paid close attention to NATO, regularly attending meetings of its Nuclear Planning Group and its Defense Planning Committee, and stressing the alliance's importance in the deterrence of the Soviet Union. While supporting the current SALT negotiations, he did not consider the proposed SALT II settlement a final solution to Soviet-American rivalry and emphasized the need to maintain military equivalence.

Given these views and initiatives, increasing the defense budget was an imperative for Rumsfeld. He spent his first few weeks in office completing the proposed FY 1977 budget. In spite of his previous differences with Schlesinger over budget matters, President Ford agreed with Rumsfeld's arguments that U.S. force levels and defense expenditures had been decreasing in real terms for several years and that building real growth into the FY 1977 budget was essential to the nation's security. Congress generally cooperated, although it cut some funds Rumsfeld wanted, including those proposed for shipbuilding. Ultimately, total obligatory authority in the FY 1977 budget was set at \$107.7 billion. Still, the FY 1977 budget, in constant dollars, was only a little more than it had been in FY 1956.

Rumsfeld continued his efforts to augment funding in preparing the FY 1978 defense budget. When Ford presented his new budget to Congress just before leaving office, he proposed another increase for defense. However, during the 1976 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter had criticized Ford administration defense spending and urged a substantial decrease. Thus the final FY 1978 TOA for the Department of Defense amounted to \$116.2 billion, an increase in the current dollar amount but a slight decrease in real dollars. While Rumsfeld maintained the momentum begun by Schlesinger to halt the decline in defense spending, his brief term and the change in administration limited his success.

An active secretary of defense, Rumsfeld remained very close to the president and very much in the public eye. Had Ford been reelected in 1976 it is likely that he would have retained Rumsfeld, who left office with the president on 20 January

1977. After briefly teaching at Northwestern University, Rumsfeld became president and chief executive officer of G.D. Searle and Company, a health care concern based in Illinois. He continued to write and speak about defense issues, stressing the need for adequate defense spending in order to maintain

equivalence with the Soviet Union. Rumsfeld opposed the 1979 SALT II treaty, believing that it was not advantageous to the United States. Between November 1983 and May 1984, Rumsfeld served President Ronald Reagan as special ambassador to the Middle East.

Harold Brown (1977-1981)

President Carter's choice as secretary of defense, Harold Brown, came to office with imposing academic credentials and a wealth of experience in national security affairs. Born in New York City on 19 September 1927, Brown took three degrees at Columbia University, including, at age 21 in 1949, a Ph.D. in physics. After a short period of teaching and postdoctoral research, Brown became a research scientist at the University of California Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. In 1952 he joined the staff of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California, and became its director in 1960. During the 1950s he served as a member of or consultant to several federal scientific bodies and as senior science adviser at the 1958-59 Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests. Brown worked under Robert McNamara as director of defense research and engineering from 1961 to 1965, and then as secretary of the air force from October 1965 to February 1969. Between 1969 and 1977 he was president of the California Institute of Technology. With almost eight years of prior service in the Pentagon, Brown was the first scientist to become secretary of defense.

Brown involved himself in practically all areas of departmental activity. Consistent with the Carter administration's objective to reorganize the federal government, Brown launched a comprehensive review of defense organization. During his first year in office, he commissioned studies on resource management, general management, and the national command structure. Brown summarized his criticisms of the existing defense organization in his first annual report issued early in 1978: OSD and the military department headquarters were too large and undertook tasks that could be handled at lower echelons; too many units—29 major offices and 7 unified/specified commands—reported directly to the secretary; the existence of two deputy secretary of defense positions "confused the distribution of executive responsibilities and lines



of authority within the Department"; there was a need to integrate logistics and manpower activities; "intelligence users and defense policy makers needed to have more influence over the requirements and priorities established for communications, command and control, and intelligence"; the weapons acquisition process needed closer integration with research and engineering; and there was a need for "clearer top management focus on NATO aspects of defense management at both OSD and Service levels." In April 1977 Brown proposed reorganization legislation which Congress passed and President Carter signed in October. This law and several executive

orders brought significant change in DoD organization and management during Brown's first two years in office.

As early as March 1977 Brown established the position of assistant secretary of defense for communications, command, control, and intelligence (ASD/C³I). The next month he combined functions previously assigned to two assistant secretaries into the new position of assistant secretary of defense for manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics. The October 1977 law eliminated one of the deputy secretary of defense positions and created two under secretaries of defense, one for policy and one for research and engineering. In the same month Brown announced formation of the Washington Headquarters Services; directed by the deputy assistant secretary of defense for administration, WHS was to "provide consolidated administrative and operating support" to OSD and other defense activities in the Washington area.

In February 1978 Brown announced additional reorganization decisions, including reduction in the number of assistant secretaries (3 in OSD, 1 in each of the military departments) from 22 to 16. Other changes involved upgrading the director of planning and evaluation (the current head of the former systems analysis office) to assistant secretary of defense for program analysis and evaluation, appointing an advisor on NATO affairs reporting directly to the secretary, and eliminating the positions of director and deputy director of the Women's Army Corps, recognizing the full integration of women into the Army. Finally, in October 1978 President Carter approved legislation making the Marine Corps commandant a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Brown understood the limits to effective reform. In one of his first major speeches after leaving office, "Managing the Defense Department—Why It Can't Be Done," at the University of Michigan in March 1981, he observed:

. . . I want to note again the basic limitation of any attempt to manage the Defense Department in an idealized textbook fashion. The pull of the need to be able to fight a war, if necessary, will always limit the peacetime efficiency of the defense establishment The pull of conflicting domestic interests represents democratic government To manage defense efficiently and at the lowest possible cost along presumed business lines of management and

organization is a useful standard. But there are prices we cannot afford to pay for meeting it exactly. One is the abandonment of democratic control. Another is the loss of a war. Defense cannot be "managed" like a business. But it can be *led* so as to preserve most effectively our national security interests.

With regard to strategic planning, Brown was guided by much the same concerns as his Republican predecessors—the need to upgrade U.S. military forces and improve collective security arrangements—but with a stronger commitment to arms control. Brown adhered to the principle of "essential equivalence" in the nuclear competition with the Soviet Union. This meant that "Soviet strategic nuclear forces do not become usable instruments of political leverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage; nuclear stability, especially in a crisis, is maintained; any advantages in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by U.S. advantages in other characteristics; and the U.S. posture is not in fact, and is not seen as, inferior in performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union."

Brown considered it essential to maintain the triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers; some of the administration's most important decisions on weapon systems reflected this commitment. Although Brown decided not to produce the B-1 bomber, he did recommend upgrading existing B-52s and equipping them with air-launched cruise missiles, and gave the go-ahead for development of a "stealth" technology that would make it possible to produce planes (bombers as well as other aircraft) with very low radar profiles, presumably able to elude enemy defenses and deliver weapons on targets. The administration backed development of the MX missile, intended to replace in the 1980s the increasingly vulnerable MINUTEMAN and TITAN intercontinental missiles. To insure MX survivability, Brown recommended that the missiles be deployed in "multiple protective shelters"; 200 MX missiles would be placed in Utah and Nevada, with each missile to be shuttled among 23 different shelters of its own located along roadways—meaning a total of 4600 such shelters. Although this plan was expensive and environmentally controversial, Brown argued that it was the most viable scheme to protect the missiles from enemy attack. For the sea leg of the triad, Brown accelerated development of the larger TRIDENT nuclear submarine and carried forward the conversion of POSEIDON submarines to a fully

MIRVed missile capability.

By early 1979 Brown and his staff had developed a "countervailing strategy," an approach to nuclear targeting that both McNamara and Schlesinger earlier had found attractive but never formally codified. As Brown put it, "We must have forces and plans for the use of our strategic nuclear forces such that in considering aggression against our interests, our adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a success—on any rational definition of success. The prospect of such a failure would then deter an adversary's attack on the United States or our vital interests." Although Brown did not rule out the assured destruction approach which stressed attacks on urban and industrial targets, he believed that "such destruction must not be automatic, our only choice, or independent of any enemy's attack. Indeed, it is at least conceivable that the mission of assured destruction would not have to be executed at all in the event that deterrence failed."

Official adoption of the countervailing strategy came with President Carter's approval of Presidential Directive 59 (PD 59) on 25 July 1980. In explaining PD 59, Brown argued that it "is *not* a new strategic doctrine; it is *not* a radical departure It is, in fact, a refinement, a codification of previous statements of our strategic policy." The heart of PD 59, as Brown described it, was as follows:

It is our policy—and we have increasingly the means and the detailed plans to carry out this policy—to ensure that the Soviet leadership knows that if they chose some intermediate level of aggression, we could, by selective, large (but still less than maximum) nuclear attacks, exact an unacceptably high price in the things the Soviet leaders appear to value most—political and military control, military force both nuclear and conventional, and the industrial capability to sustain a war. In our planning we have not ignored the problem of ending the war, nor would we ignore it in the event of a war. And, of course, we have, and we will keep, a survivable and enduring capability to attack the full range of targets, including the Soviet economic base, if that is the appropriate response to a Soviet strike.

Because the almost simultaneous disclosures of PD 59 and the stealth technology came in the

midst of the 1980 presidential campaign, some critics asserted that the Carter administration leaked them to counter charges of weakness and boost its reelection chances. Others charged that PD 59 made it more likely that the United States would initiate a nuclear conflict, based on the assumption that a nuclear war could somehow be limited. Brown insisted that the countervailing strategy was not a first-strike strategy. As he put it, "We are talking about what we could and . . . would do *in response* to a Soviet attack. Nothing in the policy contemplates that nuclear war can be a deliberate instrument of achieving our national security goals But we cannot afford the risk that the Soviet leadership might entertain the illusion that nuclear war could be an option—or its threat a means of coercion—for *them*."

Brown regarded the strengthening of NATO as a key national security objective and worked hard to invigorate the alliance. With the assistance of Robert W. Komer, at first his special adviser on NATO affairs and subsequently under secretary of defense for policy, Brown launched a series of NATO initiatives shortly after taking office. In May 1978 the NATO heads of government endorsed a "Long Term Defense Program" which included 10 priority categories: enhanced readiness; rapid reinforcement; strengthened European reserve forces; improvements in maritime capabilities; integrated air defenses; effective command, control, and communications; electronic warfare; rationalized procedures for armaments collaboration; logistics coordination and increased war reserves; and theater nuclear modernization. To implement the last item, NATO defense and foreign ministers decided in December 1979 to respond to the Soviet deployment of new theater nuclear weapons—the SS-20 missile and the BACKFIRE bomber—by placing 108 PERSHING II missiles and 464 ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in several Western European countries beginning in December 1983. The NATO leaders indicated that the new missile deployment would be scaled down if satisfactory progress occurred in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

At Brown's urging, NATO members pledged in 1977 to increase their individual defense spending by 3 percent per year in real terms for the 1979-86 period. The objective, Brown explained, "is to obtain the resources needed to ensure that Alliance capabilities—both conventional and nuclear—balance those of the Soviet Union and its satellites." Although some NATO members hesitated to confirm the agreement to accept new missiles and did not always attain the 3 percent

target, Brown was pleased with NATO's progress. Midway in his term he told an interviewer that he thought his most important achievement thus far had been the revitalization of NATO.

Brown also tried to strengthen the defense contributions of U.S. allies outside of NATO, particularly Japan and Korea. He repeatedly urged the Japanese government to increase its defense budget so that it could take up a larger share of the Western allies' Pacific security burden. Although the Carter administration decided in 1977 on a phased withdrawal of United States ground forces from the Republic of Korea, it pledged to continue military and other assistance to Korea. Later, because of a substantial buildup of North Korean military forces and opposition to the troop withdrawal in the United States, the president shelved the plan, leaving approximately 40,000 U.S. troops in Korea. Carter established formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 January 1979 after a rupture of 30 years. A year later Brown visited the PRC, talked with its political and military leaders, and helped lay the groundwork for limited collaboration on security issues.

Arms control was an integral part of Brown's national security policy. He staunchly supported the June 1979 SALT II treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union and was the administration's leading spokesman in urging the Senate to approve it. SALT II limited both sides to 2,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs, and air-to-surface ballistic missiles), including a sublimit of 1,200 launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles, of which only 820 could be launchers of MIRVed ICBMs. It also placed restrictions on the number of warheads on each missile and on deployment of new land-based ballistic missile systems, except for one new type of light ICBM for each side. There was also a provision for verification by each side using its own national technical means.

Brown explained that SALT II would reduce the Soviet Union's strategic forces, bring enhanced predictability and stability to Soviet-U.S. nuclear relationships, reduce the cost of maintaining a strategic balance, help the United States to monitor Soviet forces, and reduce the risk of nuclear war. He rebutted charges by SALT II critics that the United States had underestimated the Soviet military buildup, that the treaty would weaken the Western alliance, that the Soviet Union could not be trusted to obey the treaty, and that its terms could not really be verified. Partly to placate Senate opponents of the treaty, the Carter ad-

ministration agreed in the fall of 1979 to support higher increases in the defense budget. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 ensured that the Senate would not accept the treaty at that time, forcing the president to withdraw it from consideration. When his term ended in 1981, Brown said that failure to secure ratification of SALT II was his greatest regret.

Besides broad national security policy matters, Brown had to deal with several more immediate questions, among them the Panama Canal issue. Control of the canal zone had been a source of contention ever since Panama achieved its independence from Colombia in 1903 and granted the United States a concession "in perpetuity." In the mid-1960s, after serious disturbances in the zone, the United States and Panama began negotiations which went on intermittently until 7 September 1977 when the countries signed two treaties, one providing for full Panamanian control of the canal by the year 2000 and the other guaranteeing the canal's neutrality. The Defense Department played a major role in the Panama negotiations. Brown championed the treaties through a difficult fight to gain Senate approval (secured in March and April 1978), insisting that they were both advantageous to the United States and essential to the canal's future operation and security.

In Middle East affairs, Brown supported President Carter's efforts as an intermediary in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations leading to the Camp David Accords of September 1978 and the signing by the two nations of a peace treaty in March 1979. Elsewhere, the fall of the Shah from power in Iran in January 1979 eliminated a major U.S. ally and triggered a chain of events that played havoc with American policy in the region. In November 1979, Iranian revolutionaries occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took more than 50 hostages. Brown participated closely in planning for a rescue operation that ended in failure and the loss of eight U.S. servicemen on 24-25 April 1980. Not until the last day of his administration, on 20 January 1981, could President Carter make final arrangements for the release of the hostages.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to bolster a pro-Soviet communist government further complicated the role of the United States in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. In response to the events in Iran and Afghanistan and in anticipation of others, Brown activated the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida on 1 March 1980. Although normally a planning head-

quarters without operational units, the RDJTF could obtain such forces from the several services and command them in specific crisis situations. Brown explained that the RDJTF was responsible for "developing operational plans for likely contingencies, particularly in Southwest Asia," and maintaining adequate capabilities and readiness for such missions.

As with all of his predecessors, budget matters occupied a major portion of Brown's time. During the 1976 campaign, Carter criticized defense spending levels of the Ford administration and promised cuts in the range of \$5 billion to \$7 billion. Shortly after he became secretary, Brown suggested a series of amendments to Ford's proposed FY 1978 budget, having the effect of cutting it by almost \$3 billion, but still allowing a TOA increase of about \$8.5 billion over the FY 1977 budget. Subsequent budgets under Brown moved generally upward, reflecting high prevailing rates of inflation, the need to strengthen and modernize conventional forces neglected somewhat since the end of the Vietnam conflict, and serious challenges in the Middle East, Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

The Brown defense budgets by fiscal year, in TOA, were as follows: 1978, \$116.2 billion; 1979, \$124.6 billion; 1980, \$142.1 billion; and 1981,

\$176.03 billion. In terms of real growth, there were slight negative percentages in 1978 and 1979, a 2.1 percent increase in 1980, and an 11.4 percent increase in 1981. It should be noted that part of the increase for FY 1981 resulted from supplemental appropriations obtained by the Reagan administration, but nevertheless the Carter administration by this time had departed substantially from its early emphasis on curtailing the defense budget. Its proposals for FY 1982, submitted in January 1981, called for \$196.4 billion in TOA, representing significant real growth over the TOA for FY 1981.

Secretary Brown left office on 20 January 1981, following President Carter's unsuccessful bid for reelection. During the 1980 campaign, Brown actively defended the Carter administration's policies, speaking frequently on defense issues in public. After leaving the Pentagon, he remained in Washington, joining the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies as a visiting professor. He continued to speak and write widely on national security issues, and in 1983 published *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World*. Also in 1983 Brown served as a counselor to the President's Commission on Strategic Forces.


Caspar W. Weinberger (1981—)

Caspar W. Weinberger, designated by President-elect Ronald Reagan to be the fifteenth secretary of defense, had broad experience in government. Born in San Francisco on 18 August 1917, the son of a lawyer, Weinberger received an A.B. degree in 1938 and a law degree in 1941, both from Harvard. He entered the U.S. Army as a private in 1941, was subsequently commissioned, and then served in the Pacific theater. At the end of the war he was a member of General Douglas MacArthur's intelligence staff, with the rank of captain. Between 1945 and 1947 Weinberger worked as a law clerk and then joined a San Francisco law firm.

Weinberger won election to the State Assembly of California in 1952 and reelection in 1954 and 1956. Unsuccessful in his campaign for California attorney general in 1958, Weinberger remained active in politics, becoming chairman of the state Republican Party in 1962. In 1967 Governor Ronald

Reagan named him chairman of the Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy and in early 1968, director of finance. He moved to Washington in January 1970 to become chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. Subsequently during the Nixon and Ford administrations he served as deputy director (1970-72) and director (1972-73) of the Office of Management and Budget and as secretary of health, education, and welfare (1973-75). Between 1975 and his appointment to President Reagan's cabinet, Weinberger was vice president and general counsel of the Bechtel Group of Companies in California.

Although not experienced in defense matters, Weinberger was widely known in Washington as an able administrator and manager and particularly for his cost-cutting prowess—earning him the sobriquet "Cap the Knife." Despite his reputation as an economizer, at the Pentagon Weinberger became a vigorous advocate of President Reagan's



plan to increase the defense budget, sharing the President's convictions that the Soviet Union was an imminent threat to the United States and that the defense establishment had been shortchanged in the previous decade. Readiness, sustainability, and modernization became the watchwords of the Weinberger defense program.

Of special concern to the new administration was a perceived decline in U.S. strategic capabilities relative to Soviet forces. Weinberger noted early in 1982 that "the period in the mid-1980s when major and critical components of our present strategic deterrent forces could be destroyed by an enemy surprise attack is our most vulnerable period." He played a key role in developing a five-point proposal, announced by President Reagan in the fall of 1981, to revitalize the strategic deterrent: improvement of communications, command, and control systems; modernization of the strategic bomber force; deployment of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile; improvement of the survivability and accuracy of new ICBMs; and improvement in strategic defenses to help deter nuclear attacks. In specific terms the plan included deployment of E-4B aircraft (airborne command posts) to serve the National Command Authorities in wartime; production of 100 B-1B strategic bombers with ini-

tial operational capability in 1986, and development of a stealth aircraft with deployment at the end of the 1980s; development of the TRIDENT II (D-5) missile, a larger and more accurate SLBM, to be deployed in 1989; production of 100 MX ("Peacekeeper") missiles, about one-third of which would be deployed in extra-hardened TITAN or MINUTEMAN III silos, and studies of other possible deployment schemes; and enhanced air surveillance with improved radar, deployment of F-15 aircraft (as interceptors) as well as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes, greater attention to civil defense, and development of an anti-satellite system.

Some aspects of this strategic modernization plan proved controversial, particularly the proposed deployment of the MX missile. Reagan rejected the Carter administration's plan for multiple protective shelters, but his own proposals raised strong objections also. Congressional opposition forced the administration to drop both its initial plan to deploy some MXs in existing silos and a subsequent "dense pack" proposal—to place 100 MX missiles in hardened silos closely spaced in the western area of the United States. In January 1983 President Reagan appointed the Commission on Strategic Forces, headed by retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, to review the purpose, nature, and composition of U.S. strategic forces. In its report, submitted in April, the commission recommended placing 100 MX missiles in existing MINUTEMAN silos and designing a new, smaller single-warhead mobile missile (15 tons compared to the nearly 100-ton MX) that could be ready for deployment in 1987. Reagan endorsed and Congress both approved the Scowcroft commission proposals and appropriated funds for flight testing and initial production of the MX. To blunt congressional criticism of the MX and other costly programs, such as the 600-ship Navy, the Reagan administration promised at the same time to pursue arms control negotiations, especially the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations, both at Geneva, Switzerland.

While striving to upgrade strategic nuclear weapon systems to improve U.S. deterrent credibility, Weinberger also studied how these weapons might be used if deterrence failed. These plans were being developed, he emphasized, "with the express intention of assuring that nuclear war never will be fought." Weinberger explained that the United States had to prepare to fight a protracted nuclear conflict because the Soviet Union was doing the same. Denying the

assertions of critics that the administration had embraced the concept of a fightable and winnable nuclear war, Weinberger countered that "we see nuclear weapons only as a way of discouraging the Soviets from thinking that they could ever resort to them." The United States needed a capability for protracted response, Weinberger said, "to demonstrate that our strategic forces could survive Soviet strikes over an extended . . . period."

Modernization and the perceived need to make up for past funding deficiencies required significant budgetary increases, for which Weinberger fought hard and quite successfully. Soon after taking office he sought a supplemental appropriation of nearly \$7 billion for the current FY 1981 defense budget and an increase of almost \$26 billion over President Carter's proposed FY 1982 budget. Congress proved generally agreeable: the final FY 1981 figure was \$176.03 billion, and for FY 1982, \$211.3 billion. The latter amount represented 12.3 percent real growth. The original FY 1983 budget request, presented early in 1982, was for \$258 billion TOA. After stepped-up congressional resistance, the Defense Department finally received \$238.7 billion TOA, an increase of 8.4 percent in real dollars. Weinberger's original FY 1984 request was \$274.1 billion TOA; Congress agreed to \$259.07 billion, a 4.3 percent real increase. The initial request for FY 1985, presented in February 1984, was for \$305.6 billion TOA; after long and sometimes heated debate, Congress granted \$285.1 billion. Thus, while Secretary Weinberger obtained large increases in the defense budget between 1981 and 1984, Congress consistently provided lesser amounts than asked for by the Reagan administration.

While the expansion of military forces and accelerated development and production of new weapon systems caused Weinberger to devote a substantial portion of his time to the budget, including much congressional testimony, he found himself busy on many other fronts as well. He served as the administration's chief defense spokesman, traveling extensively at home and abroad. He also managed DoD's involvement in a spate of regional problems: widening concern over communist activity in Central America and the Caribbean, spotlighted by a U.S. military operation in Grenada in October 1983 to free the island of a Marxist dictatorship; participation of U.S. Marines beginning in August 1982 in an international peacekeeping force in Lebanon, a mission that resulted in a terrorist bombing of the Marine headquarters in Beirut that killed 241 U.S. servicemen; support of Great Britain during the summer of

1982 in its short war with Argentina in the South Atlantic over control of the Falkland Islands; and monitoring the progress of a war between Iraq and Iran that threatened to close vital oil-shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf. With regard to the Persian Gulf area, to facilitate possible U.S. military defense of the region, on 1 October 1981 DoD chartered the existing Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force as a separate command reporting directly to the National Command Authorities through the JCS, with operational planning responsibility for Southwest Asia and operational control of selected Air Force and Army units. On 1 January 1983 the RDJTF, redesignated U.S. Central Command, became a unified command for Southwest Asia.

Although he functioned more as the outside representative of the Department of Defense and left day-to-day internal management to the deputy secretary (Frank C. Carlucci, 1981-83; Paul Thayer, 1983-84; and William H. Taft IV, 1984-), Weinberger instituted important management and organizational changes to achieve "a proper balance between centralized policy formulation and decentralized program execution." He strengthened the role of the service secretaries—including seating them on the Defense Resources Board, an advisory group that consulted on major resource decisions. Weinberger also met regularly with the JCS and sought their advice on key issues; when announcing changes in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) early in his administration, he stressed the responsibility of the JCS "for the development of more comprehensive strategic planning of military objectives, policies and strategies" and urged the chiefs to assume a more integral role in budget planning. Reversing the previous administration's approach, Weinberger restructured some of the assistant secretary positions and asked Congress, which responded positively, to provide additional assistant secretaries for both OSD and the military departments. Under pressure from Congress and amid reports of widespread fraud, waste, and abuse in procurement and other DoD operations, Weinberger in April 1981 established the office of the assistant to the secretary of defense for review and oversight; in May 1983, following the passage of legislation included in the FY 1983 defense authorization bill, the office was redesignated the office of the inspector general. Weinberger hoped the policing activities of the inspector general and the institution of a series of reforms in the weapon acquisition process would save the Pentagon substantial money and help offset the burgeoning costs of weapon systems.

During the presidential campaign of 1984, Weinberger vigorously defended the administration's national security record against allegations of excessive weapon costs, questionable arms programs, and a halfhearted commitment to arms control. With the reelection of President Reagan to a second term, both the Weinberger agenda and the defense debate seemed likely to continue for some time.

Conclusion

Between 1947 and 1985, 15 men served as secretary of defense. Eight had prior national security experience—six of them in the Department of Defense or its predecessor agencies (the War and Navy Departments) and two in related agencies (AEC, CIA, and State). Their professional backgrounds varied, including four lawyers, three investment bankers, three industrialists, two politicians who had been elected to national office, one economist, one scientist, and one professional military officer. The average term of the first 14 secretaries was 28 1/2 months, although one served less than 4 months and another more than 7 years.

The secretary of defense presides over a vast confederation of agencies which today employ well over 3,000,000 military and civilian personnel and consume nearly 30% of the annual federal budget. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the immediate staff of the secretary, has evolved from a mere handful of employees and limited functions when it was established in 1947 to an authorized strength of more than 1700 positions in 1985 and duties which require a deputy secretary, 2 under secretaries, and 11 assistant secretaries concerned with as many functional areas. Over the years, OSD has borne the main burden of implementing a central mandate of the National Security Act—to provide for "authoritative coordination and unified direction [of the military services] under civilian control" and for "effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." While some have been more successful than others in accomplishing these goals, all of the secretaries of defense have encountered difficulty in overseeing the services, whose historic competition for resources and missions has invariably complicated the secretary's job.

As this study shows, legislative and institutional changes greatly facilitated the trend toward centralization of authority in OSD after 1947, but the characteristics and inclinations of the individual secretaries of defense, as well as the disposition of their chiefs in the White House, significantly affected the exercise of power. Louis Johnson, dedicated to a tight budget and not afraid to take summary executive action, did not hesitate to cancel construction of an aircraft carrier coveted by the Navy. Robert McNamara took bold initiatives and exerted personal influence in a wide range of Pentagon concerns—the sweep of his office was perhaps wider than any other secretary's. McNamara, of course, had support in his management of the Pentagon from Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and this was a critical factor. Had he served under President Eisenhower, it is unlikely that he would have had the opportunity to conduct the department's affairs in the same manner.

Quite clearly, whatever the respective philosophies and approaches of the individual secretaries, each enhanced or influenced the office in some way, although in some instances brief tenure prevented major accomplishments. James Forrestal, a hesitant innovator who was compelled early in his trailblazing term to arbitrate the quarrels of the military services, set standards and instituted practices which still influence his successors. George Marshall, a career military officer, contributed much to strengthening the principle of civilian control of the defense establishment. Robert Lovett's suggestions about organizational reform contributed significantly to the major reorganization plan implemented in 1953. Thomas Gates, in an effort to improve relationships between OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, initiated procedures for consultation which remain in effect 25 years later. Robert McNamara instituted

organizational and management changes which consolidated power in OSD, and he devoted more time to developing strategic policy than any of his predecessors. Among his successors, James Schlesinger and Harold Brown in particular gave much attention to strategic policy. Caspar Weinberger demonstrated effective tenacity in securing from Congress increased defense budgets.

Presidents have had varying objectives in selecting their secretaries of defense: Truman's selection of Johnson in 1949 may have had more than the usual political motivation for such appointments, but the next year, when he replaced him with Marshall, he moved to enhance the prestige of the office and gain effective military direction of the Korean War. Eisenhower picked Charles Wilson because he wanted an efficient manager rather than a strategist; Nixon picked Melvin Laird in part because of his excellent congressional ties; Carter nominated Brown because of his scientific and technical expertise and experience in defense matters that made him well suited to manage the Pentagon at a time of critical decisions on weapons and strategy. Thus, each president applies criteria that derive from his personal predilections and contemporary political circumstances. Perhaps most important are the president's views on defense policy and how he conceives of the role of the secretary of defense.

In sum the factors that affect a secretary's performance are myriad: besides the vagaries of circumstance and personality, the capacity to work with the president, the secretary of state, and

other high national security officials; prior experience in the national security field; understanding of the federal bureaucracy, especially the military services; understanding of the budget process and experience in congressional relations; experience in crisis management; understanding of and interest in nuclear strategy; technical-scientific expertise; experience in managing a large organization; diplomatic skills (especially as the relationship between foreign policy and defense matters has become increasingly blurred in recent years); and perhaps past military service. The history of the secretaries of defense suggests the usefulness of these qualifications, but no secretary has possessed them all, and there is no guarantee that an incumbent who did would be successful.

From the beginning, the office of the secretary of defense faced formidable demands which grew in number and complexity, reflecting persistent tensions around the world, especially with the Soviet Union, and the increasingly complicated technology of modern weapon systems. The secretaries of defense have differed considerably, sometimes markedly, in their response to these demands and have achieved varying degrees of success at meeting them. Whatever their special strengths and objectives, they have headed a department which has become one of the great centers of power and decision in the U.S. government and consequently they have played and will no doubt continue to play a major role in both domestic and international affairs.

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Appendices

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A. The Pentagon

Directly across the Potomac River from the District of Columbia in Arlington County, Virginia, is the building that has become a synonym for the Department of Defense—the Pentagon. This enormous and busy structure had its origins during World War II. The tremendous demands placed on the War Department after the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 greatly increased its need for office space. By 1941 War Department personnel worked in at least 17 different buildings in the District of Columbia. A new departmental building opened in northwest Washington in 1941 was already inadequate before it was occupied.

The prime mover in planning an edifice large enough to house all War Department headquarters personnel was Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, at the time chief of the construction division under the U.S. Army Quartermaster General. As an alternative to proposals to erect temporary buildings for the War Department, Somervell and his associates developed plans, in less than four days in 1941, for a mammoth three-story facility to house 40,000 people. As the site, Somervell proposed 67 acres at Arlington Farms, a former Department of Agriculture experiment station located just across the Memorial Bridge on the Virginia side of the Potomac. His original plan envisioned a five-sided reinforced concrete structure with 5 million square feet of floor space, with most of the interior space to be divided by temporary partitions, and private offices only for high officials. The pentagonal design derived from the fact that the intended construction site was bounded by five existing roads.

After Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved the proposal, Congress debated it during the summer of 1941. Estimating total cost at \$35 million, the War Department put forth several arguments for the new building: it would relieve crowding in other federal departments, since they could occupy space vacated by the War Department; the government could save \$3 million per year in rental fees for War Department offices; the Navy could take over the Munitions Building, then occupied by War, saving \$22 million currently proposed for a new Navy Department building; some apartments occupied by the War Department could be released for private residential use, easing Washington's critical housing shortage; the consolidated structure would be more convenient for persons doing business with the department—they would not have to travel to several different buildings; and

the War Department's efficiency would increase between 20 and 40 percent.

In Congress the Pentagon plan aroused controversy. Both the federal Commission on Fine Arts and the National Capital Park and Planning Commission objected to the proposed site. The chairman of the Commission on Fine Arts argued that the site commanded the view from Arlington Cemetery to the city of Washington and had long been intended for expansion of the cemetery. The Park and Planning Commission advised against construction of such a large building because of anticipated traffic and other problems caused by the concentration of 40,000 workers in one location. Others argued that major federal departments should not be located outside of the District of Columbia. Under Secretary Patterson, refuting this last argument, stated that "a strong boy could throw a stone into the District of Columbia from this site almost."

Some senators and representatives predicted that cost overruns would at least double the projected \$35 million price. There were suggestions that the building would be a white elephant, that after the current emergency the War Department would be cut back to normal size and would not need the space. On this issue Rep. Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois asked, "Will we need a \$35,000,000 monument on the other side of the Potomac" after the war ended? Proponents of the building made several proposals for its postwar use; Under Secretary Patterson envisioned using part of the space for military barracks, and others, including President Roosevelt, suggested that it could be used for the storage of records or as a general warehouse. It is often stated that the Pentagon was designed for use as a veterans' hospital after the war. Such intent was not mentioned in the War Department proposals or in the House and Senate hearings and floor debate in 1941. The hospital idea appears to be a myth that originated sometime after 1941.

After a thorough examination of the building plan, Congress agreed to appropriate the requested funds. When he signed the appropriation bill on 25 August 1941, President Roosevelt, apparently influenced by some of the arguments against Arlington Farms, reserved the right to decide later on the location. In a press conference the next day the president announced that an alternate site about three-fourths of a mile southeast of Arlington Farms, previously reserved for a quartermaster depot, would be used. Roosevelt also said



he preferred a building half as large as planned, and that after the emergency the War Department should be permanently located in the "Northwest Triangle" of the District of Columbia, with the Virginia building used for records storage.

Ignoring Roosevelt's expressed size preference, General Somervell broke ground on the depot site for a building with 5 sides, 3 floors, and 4 million square feet of floor space. The architect was George E. Bergstrom and the prime contractor was the John T. McShain Company of Philadelphia. In October 1941 the president approved Somervell's plans and construction proceeded at a very rapid pace. Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, a fourth floor was added to the plan, and later a fifth. To conserve steel and other metals, concrete ramps instead of elevators were used to connect floors, and the outside walls were made of reinforced concrete. At times of peak employment 13,000 workers labored on the project. By 30 April 1942, about eight months after groundbreaking, the contractor completed the first two sections of the building and War Department personnel began to move in. The building was finished by 15 January

1943. As predicted in 1941, the structure cost more than originally estimated. Answering complaints in Congress in February 1944 about the high costs of constructing the Pentagon, the War Department reported expenditures of \$63 million. Later calculations put the figure above \$80 million, probably close to the actual cost.

The 5-story Pentagon building has 5 concentric rings connected by 10 spoke-like corridors ranging out from the inner, or A, ring. The combined length of the corridors and rings is 17 1/2 miles and the total gross floor area is more than 6.5 million square feet. The length of each of the five outer walls is 921 feet and the structure is slightly over 71 feet in height. Because of the unique design of the building, it takes no more than 10 minutes to walk between any two extremities. The Pentagon includes numerous snack bars, cafeterias, and dining rooms, a shopping concourse, banks, a subway station, a bus platform, and many other facilities. Its population has varied over the years, peaking during wartime periods at well over 30,000.

B. References

The select list of references below includes many of the works used to prepare this brief history and provides a guide for further reading on the subject.

The following original sources are useful: Alice C. Cole et al, eds., *The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978* (1978); Department of Defense, *Public Statements of the Secretary of Defense*, several volumes annually, compiled by the Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, published for the years 1947-1981 on microfilm by University Publications of America; Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, *Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense* (1 July 1970); and Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, several volumes for each year, currently available to the mid-1950s, compiled by the Office of the Historian, Department of State.

Two pertinent bibliographies are Richard Burt, comp., *Congressional Hearings on American Defense Policy: 1947-1971* (1974), and John Greenwood, comp., *American Defense Policy Since 1945: A Preliminary Bibliography* (1973). Among published books the following are helpful: Harold Brown, *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World* (1983); Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study*

of Conflict and the Policy Process (1966); Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969* (1971); Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (1981); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (1982); E. Bruce Geelhoed, *Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953 to 1957* (1979); Paul Y. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (1961); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (1961); William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (1964); Douglas Kinnard, *The Secretary of Defense* (1980); Lawrence J. Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-five Years*, (1976); Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office* (1968); Walter Millis, Ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (1951); Steven L. Rearden, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vol. 1, The Formative Years, 1947-1950* (1984); John C. Ries, *The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Services* (1964); Arnold A. Rogow, *James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy* (1963); Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (1962); and Paul R. Schratz, Ed., *Evolution of the American Military Establishment Since World War II* (1978).

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C. Secretaries of Defense, 1947-1985

<i>Secretary</i>	<i>Appointing President</i>	<i>Dates of Service</i>	<i>Professional Background</i>	<i>Official National Security Experience</i>	<i>Length of Service (in months)</i>
Forrestal	Truman	17 Sep 47-28 Mar 49	Investment banker	Und SecNav, 40-44; SecNav, 44-47	18
Johnson	Truman	28 Mar 49-19 Sep 50	Lawyer	Asst SecWar, 37-40	18
Marshall	Truman	21 Sep 50-12 Sep 51	Military officer	U.S. Army, 1902-; Army COS, 39-45; SecState, 47-49	12
Lovett	Truman	17 Sep 51-20 Jan 53	Investment banker	Asst SecWar for Air, 41-45; Und SecState, 47-49; DepSecDef, 50-51	16
Wilson	Eisenhower	28 Jan 53-8 Oct 57	Industrialist	None	56
McElroy	Eisenhower	9 Oct 57-1 Dec 59	Industrialist	None	26
Gates	Eisenhower	2 Dec 59-20 Jan 61	Investment banker	Und SecNav, 53-57; SecNav, 57-59; DepSecDef, 59	14
McNamara	Kennedy	21 Jan 61-29 Feb 68	Industrialist	None	85
Clifford	Johnson	1 Mar 68-20 Jan 69	Lawyer	None	11
Laird	Nixon	22 Jan 69-29 Jan 73	Politician—Govt	None	48
Richardson	Nixon	30 Jan 73-24 May 73	Lawyer	Und SecState, 69-70	4
Schlesinger	Nixon	2 Jul 73-19 Nov 75	Economist	Chr AEC, 71-73; Dir CIA, 73	29
Rumsfeld	Ford	20 Nov 75-20 Jan 77	Politician—Govt	None	14
Brown	Carter	21 Jan 77-20 Jan 81	Physicist	Dir DRE, 61-65; SecAF, 65-69	48
Weinberger	Reagan	21 Jan 81-	Lawyer	None	

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D. Total Obligational Authority (TOA), 1947-1985 (\$ in billions)

Fiscal Year	Current \$	Constant \$ (1985)	% Real Growth
1947	14.260	101.705	- 65.4
1948	11.903	80.971	- 20.4
1949	13.204	86.747	7.1
1950	14.337	87.136	0.4
1951	45.173	232.057	166.3
1952	57.188	300.717	29.6
1953	44.283	237.216	- 21.1
1954	30.429	170.804	- 28.0
1955	33.790	178.179	4.3
1956	38.065	188.888	6.0
1957	39.724	192.524	1.9
1958	41.124	191.294	- 0.6
1959	42.193	189.913	- 0.7
1960	40.257	178.217	- 6.2
1961	44.643	193.623	8.6
1962	48.434	207.377	7.1
1963	49.420	208.035	0.3
1964	49.547	200.088	- 3.8
1965	49.561	193.760	- 3.2
1966	64.532	234.887	21.2
1967	71.592	250.132	6.5
1968	74.965	250.537	0.2
1969	77.755	247.190	- 1.3
1970	75.517	224.695	- 9.1
1971	72.815	203.045	- 9.6
1972	76.502	197.090	- 2.9
1973	78.925	187.712	- 4.8
1974	81.683	180.145	- 4.0
1975	86.150	174.936	- 2.9
1976	95.695	181.818	3.9
1977	107.755	190.287	4.7
1978	116.267	189.924	- 0.2
1979	124.672	187.626	- 1.2
1980	142.161	191.487	2.1
1981	176.032	213.288	11.4
1982	211.385	239.501	12.3
1983	238.747	259.564	8.4
1984	259.073	270.839	4.3
1985	285.100	285.100	5.3

Source: *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1985*, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 1984, pp. 84-86. (Figures for 1985 cited in the source are based on *proposed* TOA. The figures cited on the chart are based on the final amount approved by Congress.)

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E. Department of Defense Seal

Joint Army and Air Force

Bulletin No. 23

DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND
THE AIR FORCE

Washington 25, D.C., 22 August 1949

SEAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.—1. The following memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, 15 August 1949, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

In accordance with the provisions of Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by Section 5 of Public Law 216, 81st Congress, August 10, 1949, and with the approval of the President, the seal of the National Military Establishment is hereby redesignated as the seal for the Department of Defense with the change of designation. The design is redescribed as follows:

An American eagle is displayed facing to the right. Wings are horizontal. The eagle grasps three crossed arrows and bears on its breast a shield whose lower two-thirds carries alternating white and red stripes and whose upper third is blue. Above the eagle is an arc of thirteen stars with alternating rays. Below the eagle is a wreath of laurel extending to the eagle's right and wreath of olive extending to the eagle's left. On an encircling band is the inscription "Department of Defense" and "United States of America."

When the seal is displayed in color, the background is to be of medium blue with the eagle and wreath in natural colors and the arrows, stars, and rays of gold. The encircling band is to be dark blue with gold edges and letters in white.



The American bald eagle, long associated with symbolism representing the United States of America and its military establishment, has been selected as an emblem of strength. In facing to the right, the field of honor is indicated. The eagle is defending the United States, represented by the Shield of thirteen pieces. The thirteen pieces are joined together by the blue chief, representing the Congress. The rays and stars above the eagle signify glory, while the three arrows are collectively symbolic of the three component parts of the Department of Defense. The laurel stands for honors received in combat defending the peace represented by the olive branch.

LOUIS JOHNSON,
Secretary of Defense


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F. Organization Charts

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OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


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
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
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
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
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